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Mahatma Gandhi is revered the world over for his views on freedom and non-
violence, ideas that he deployed with great success during India‟s freedom 
struggle. As a thinker, he is commonly believed to have been a moral 
perfectionist: anti-utilitarian in mindset and deeply skeptical of market 
mechanisms. Yet, when he engaged with the institution of copyright law during 
his lifetime—as a writer, editor, and publisher—his approach routinely abjured 
the idealism of his abstract thinking in favor of a lawyerly pragmatism. 
Characterized by a nuanced, internal understanding of the institution and its 
conflicting normative goals, Gandhi‟s thinking on copyright law reveals a 
reasoned, contextual, and incremental transformation over time, as the 
economic and political circumstances surrounding his engagement with 
copyright changed. In it we see a dimension of Gandhi‟s thinking that has thus 
far been ignored, emanating from his training as a common lawyer. This Essay 
traces the development of Gandhi‟s views on copyright to show how he 
anticipated several of the central debates and controversies that are today the 
staple of the copyright wars, and developed an approach to dealing with 
copyright‟s various problems, best described as “copyright pragmatism”. As an 
approach that draws on legal and philosophical pragmatism, copyright 
pragmatism entails a critical engagement with copyright as a legal institution 
on its own terms, but contextually and with an eye towards its various costs, 
benefits, and normative goals at each stage of engagement. The Essay then 
unpacks the analytical moves that copyright pragmatism entails to show how it 
holds important lessons for the future of copyright thinking and reform. 
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“He was no simple mystic; combined with his religious outlook was his 
lawyer-trained mind, quick and apt in reasoning.” 
— Sir Stafford Cripps, Gandhi.
1
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In late 2008, scholars and publishers in India began to realize that 
the copyright in Mahatma Gandhi‟s collected works was set to expire at the 
end of the year, i.e., on December 31, 2008.
2
 Commonly regarded as the 
“Father of the Nation” in India,
3
 Gandhi died in 1948, bequeathing the 
copyright in his works to a trust that he had helped establish, the Navjivan 
                                                          
1 Sir Stafford Cripps, Gandhi, in MAHATMA GANDHI: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS 383, 384 (Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan ed. 2000) (emphasis supplied). 
2 See, e.g., Copyright on Mahatma Gandhi‟s Literary Works to Expire Soon, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 2, 
2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/news/Copyright-on-Mahatma-Gandhis-literary-
works-to-expire-soon/videoshow/3926062.cms; Rathin Das, Copyright on Gandhi‟s Works Set to 
Expire on 1 January, LIVEMINT.COM, Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/EnoGTzI9 
2FVIpw5xtiHA7O/Copyright-on-Gandhi8217s-work-set-to-expire-on-1-January.html; Vikram 
Rautela, Now, Copyright of Mahatma Gandhi‟s Writings Belongs to the People, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 
5, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/now-copyright-of-mahatma-gandhi-s-writings-belongs-
to-people/406670.  
3 See JUDITH M. BROWN, GANDHI: PRISONER OF HOPE 2 (Yale 1991)(noting how Gandhi is “often 
assumed to be the father of modern India”).  
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Trust.
4
 A prolific writer, Gandhi had during his lifetime authored thousands 
of articles and several books, including an autobiography that has since 
been translated into several languages.
5
 Since copyright law computes its 
term of protection based on the year of the author‟s death (the idea of post 
auctor mortis), the copyright in his works was to subsist for a period of 60 
years after his death, under existing copyright law.
6
  
As was to be expected, when news of Gandhi‟s works falling into 
the public domain got around, it began to generate calls for extending the 
copyright in his works retroactively.
7
 As the leader of the Indian freedom 
movement, whose philosophy had influenced numerous other movements 
ranging from Nelson Mandela‟s efforts in South Africa to Martin Luther 
King, Jr.‟s role in the civil rights movement, granting Gandhi‟s works 
additional protection through an extension remained both politically 
expedient and morally justifiable.
8
 The U.S. had just succeeded in effecting 
a similar retroactive extension for Walt Disney‟s copyright in Mickey 
Mouse,
9
 and India itself had introduced a similar extension for Nobel 
Laureate Rabindranath Tagore‟s works in 1991.
10
 Yet, to everyone‟s 
surprise, very shortly after the idea of extending the copyright in Gandhi‟s 
works became public, the Navjivan Trust, which owned the copyright in 
Gandhi‟s works, issued a statement announcing that it would not seek such 
an extension of term, but would instead allow Gandhi‟s works to enter the 
                                                          
4 Mohandas Gandhi, Last Will and Testament, Jan. 29, 1948.  
5 See generally MAHATMA GANDHI, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI (1960) (compiling 
all of Gandhi‟s written work in a series of multiple volumes) (hereinafter CWMG). 
6 Indian Copyright Act, No. 3 of 1914, s. 3. 
7 See, e.g., Gandhi Works to Go Public 60 Years After his Death, REUTERS, Jan. 5, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/05/us-gandhi-works-idUSTRE50418A20090105 (quoting a 
Gandhi scholar as observing that “[t]he government should immediately do something about it and 
entrust the copyrights back to Navajivan Trust”). 
8 Nita Bhalla, Mandela Calls for Gandhi‟s Non-Violence Approach, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USDEL342197 (quoting Mandela as saying that Gandhi‟s 
“philosophy contributed in no small measure to bringing about a peaceful transformation in South 
Africa and in healing the destructive human divisions that had been spawned by the abhorrent 
practice of apartheid”); Placido D‟Souza, Gandhi‟s Influence on King, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 20, 
2003, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/COMMEMORATING-MARTIN-LUTHER-
KING-JR-Gandhi-s-2640319.php (describing using King‟s own language, how Gandhi came to 
influence his approach to social reform in the civil rights movement). 
9 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
10 Govt Extends Tagore Copyright for 10 Years, THE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 31, 1991, 
http://www.cscsarchive.org:8081/MediaArchive/clippings.nsf/%28docid%29/464A928EDF1489C46
525694200313BE7?OpenDocument. 
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public domain.
11
 The trustees claimed to have come to the realization that 
Gandhi “never wanted copyright law,” and that he was opposed to the 
institution.
12
 Ownership of Gandhi‟s copyrights had been an enormous 
source of revenue for the Trust, and it was now willing to sacrifice all of 
this solely to abide by Gandhi‟s own principles and beliefs.
13
 While this 
development generated a good deal of interest in leading Indian newspapers 
at the time;
14
 to those familiar with Gandhi‟s economic philosophy and 
views on the market, it seemed but logical. 
Gandhi‟s beliefs on the ideas of non-violence, truth and freedom are 
fairly well-known the world over, and commonly revered. Less respected, 
both within India and outside however, is Gandhi‟s economic philosophy. 
Writing during the British rule of India, Gandhi‟s economic thinking was 
openly hostile to “modern civilization”, “capitalism” and utilitarian 
thinking.
15
 Believing that an exclusive focus on “material progress” would 
direct attention away from the “real” and “moral” progress that India 
needed, Gandhi routinely rejected utilitarianism, which he associated with 
Bentham‟s oft-quoted ideal of the “greatest happiness of the greatest 
number”.
16
 Simple utilitarianism, he believed, would provide insufficient 
protection for minorities and other disadvantaged groups within society, by 
treating them as mere numbers.
17
 
 Gandhi‟s rejection of copyright was thus believed to have been 
informed by his philosophical opposition to market-oriented utilitarianism. 
Indeed, this is known to have been true for his opposition to private 
ownership.
18
 According to Gandhi, private ownership was justifiable only 
when owners saw themselves as trustees who held their assets not in the 
pursuit of their own self-interest, but instead for the benefit of society at 
                                                          
11 Rathin Das, Gandhians Unfazed as Mahatma‟s Copyright Ends, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Ahmedabad/Gandhians-unfazed-as-Mahatma-s-
copyright-ends/Article1-361690.aspx (quoting the Managing Trustee of the Navjivan Trust).  
12 Id. 
13 Jahnavi Contractor, Gandhi Copyright Breathes Life into Navjivan Trust, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 1, 
2003, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-10-01/ahmedabad/27179585_1_printing-
press-navjivan-trust-gandhiji; Kamran Sulaimani, With Navjivan‟s Copyright on them Gone, 
Gandhi‟s Literary Works Now Available in a New Avatar, INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 23, 2009, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/with-navjivan-s-copyright-on-them-gone-gandhi-s-literary-
works-now-available-in-a-new-avatar/437723. 
14 Id. 
15 See Kenneth Rivett, The Economic Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, 10 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 1, 1 (1959). 
16 Id. at 1-2. See also infra text accompanying notes __-__. 
17 See MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI, SARVODAYA 4 (1954) (hereinafter GANDHI, SARVODAYA). 
18 MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI, MY THEORY OF TRUSTEESHIP 102 (1970) (hereinafter GANDHI, 
TRUSTEESHIP). 
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large. Ownership thus had to become a form of “trusteeship”, wherein 
owners sacrificed the pursuit of individual self-interest for the uplift of the 
socially and economically backward segments of society.
19
 To those 
familiar with Gandhi‟s views on property, the claim that he rejected 
copyright seemed to cohere.  
 The rhetoric about Gandhi‟s supposed “rejection” of the institution 
unfortunately cast him as a naïve idealist, who despite being well-
intentioned and noble in motive, failed to fully appreciate the practical 
importance (and role) of copyright law in the production and dissemination 
of original expression. Gandhi‟s views on the subject were portrayed as 
saint-like and utopian, and while worthy of admiration, nonetheless 
dismissed as incapable of emulation in the real world.  
In reality however, nothing could be farther from the truth. Gandhi‟s 
views on copyright were far more nuanced than they are made out to be. 
What is often forgotten about Gandhi in discussions of his political and 
moral theory is the fact that he was a trained lawyer. Trained as a common 
lawyer in England, Gandhi practiced in the courts of South Africa before 
returning to India.
20
 Much of his political theory and strategy drew heavily 
from his training as a lawyer, and he readily merged law and politics in his 
early days as a lawyer in South Africa.
21
 His engagement with copyright, a 
legal institution, was thus hardly visceral, or uninformed. An examination 
of his various writings between 1926 and 1946, reveal his engagement with 
the institution to have been characterized by a lawyerly pragmatism and 
nuance that is rarely ever ascribed to Gandhi today. While this engagement 
no doubt reveals a deep unease about the utility of copyright and its inherent 
incompatibility with some of Gandhi‟s other beliefs, it also highlights how 
careful and pragmatic he was in navigating the legal structure of copyright 
when he viewed it as necessary to his ultimate purposes. Instead of rejecting 
the institution in its entirety, Gandhi at times chose to actively engage with 
the institution and then develop complex mechanisms of abandoning his 
rights, fragmenting them, or licensing them to the public for free. He even 
saw the importance of copyright as a mechanism of „attribution,‟ and in the 
process sought to segregate copyright‟s market-based aspects from its 
attributive ones. Towards the later part of his life, he also came to deploy 
                                                          
19 Id. at 43-45, 49-54. 
20 See, e.g., RAJMOHAN GANDHI, GANDHI: THE MAN, HIS PEOPLE, AND THE EMPIRE 53-88 (2008); 
YOGESH CHADHA, GANDHI: A LIFE 121-49 (1997); JOSEPH LELYVELD, GREAT SOUL: MAHATMA 
GANDHI AND HIS STRUGGLE WITH INDIA (2011). 
21 See MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 
155-59 (1957) (hereinafter GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY). 
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copyright law to curtail market-based exploitation when he could. In many 
ways then, Gandhi‟s approach did with copyright law, what Open Source 
Licensing and the Creative Commons Project would begin doing with 
copyright in the twenty-first century.
22
 
 Gandhi‟s nuanced engagement with the institution of copyright drew 
extensively from his belief in the importance of access to information and 
education for the masses, the centrality of truth in public and private 
interactions, his disdain for censorship, and perhaps most importantly, his 
steadfast commitment to ensuring that legal change come about through a 
bottom-up process. Very interestingly, not once in his discussion of 
copyright, does he reference notions of property and ownership—
suggesting a willingness and ability to engage with it as an independent 
institution, a practice unique to those familiar with the law and legal 
institutions. Gandhi‟s cautious engagement with, and contextual antipathy 
towards, copyright law thus holds several important lessons for today‟s 
debates about the proper scope of copyright law, a debate that is routinely 
cast in overly simplistic and binary terms.  
 First, his use of copyright law to realize goals that are antagonistic to 
copyright‟s dominant utilitarian understanding reveals how its legal 
framework may be used and deployed towards the realization of a plurality 
of normative goals. Meta-ethical pluralism has in recent times come to be 
seen as essential to discussions of copyright (and intellectual property more 
generally), and yet scholars and activists have struggled to develop 
mechanisms and strategies to realize this pluralism in practice. To many 
committed to this ideal, rejecting the existing framework and foundations of 
the institution seem essential. Gandhi on the other hand chose to engage 
with the institution despite his personal discomfort with its purported goals, 
only to circumvent those goals from within, i.e., by embracing it and then 
deploying its legal machinery to suit his own purposes. Second, Gandhi‟s 
actions in engaging with the legal structures of copyright reflect an 
approach to practical reasoning as a process of resolving conflicts between 
incommensurable ends. In the political sphere, Gandhi is commonly thought 
of as an “idealist.” Yet, perhaps as a consequence of his training as a 
common lawyer and despite his disdain for the legal profession as it existed 
during his time, Gandhi‟s own actions when dealing with copyright 
showcase a form of pragmatism that is characterized by a willingness to 
achieve a reasoned compromise when needed and a readiness to alter one‟s 
                                                          
22 See Creative Commons, History, http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Oct. 24, 
2012); Duncan Geere, The History of Creative Commons, WIRED.CO.UK., Dec. 13, 2011, 
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-12/13/history-of-creative-commons?page=all. 
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thinking when circumstances change. Despite its roots in the specifics of the 
Indian freedom movement, his thinking in this latter respect exhibits an 
uncanny resemblance to American pragmatism, a philosophical (and legal) 
movement that was beginning to take shape around the same time in the 
U.S. 
 Legal and philosophical pragmatism have long been understood as 
uniquely American approaches to thinking, characterized by the ideas of 
anti-foundationalism, instrumentalism, and context-sensitivity.
23
 
Pragmatism as a way of thinking took shape in the 19
th
 century, principally 
through the writing of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Charles Pierce, William 
James and later John Dewey. While there is no evidence that Gandhi and 
the 19
th
 century pragmatists ever interacted, the parallelism of their thinking 
and approach to philosophical questions is stark and revealing. Gandhi‟s 
approach to copyright provides us with a wonderful illustration of this and 
in the process lays the groundwork for the development of a fairly unique 
approach to engaging the copyright system, which this Essay describes as 
“copyright pragmatism”. Copyright pragmatism emphasizes a healthy and 
constructive skepticism towards copyright, but at the same time recognizes 
the importance of several of the institution‟s goals and objectives. As a 
method of participating in copyright‟s actual working, it entails infusing 
copyright law with a plurality of normative ideals through a reliance on the 
techniques of practical reasoning and situation-sensitivity. As an approach 
to thinking about copyright law, copyright pragmatism allows copyright 
scholars, lawyers, and activists to adopt a midway position between the 
extremes of copyright nihilism (or minimalism), and copyright 
expansionism (or maximalism), approaches that are thought to be the 
dominant positions in today‟s “copyright wars”.
24
 In the process, it enables 
the institution to continue functioning, while at the same time engaging with 
(and questioning) the universalizability of its core values and premises. 
                                                          
23 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1660 
(1990) (describing these three features). See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic 
Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1564 (2010) 
24 For recent discussion of these two positions in the copyright wars, see: WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL 
PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 1-41 (2009); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996); Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, 
and the Public Domain in Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1869-70 (2011); Justin 
Hughes, Copyright and its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 81, 82 (2009); 
Mike Masnick, Copyright Maximalists Try to Regroup and Figure Out How to “Fight Back” Against 
the Public, TECHDIRT, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120416/12020318506/copyr 
ight-maximalists-try-to-regroup-figure-out-how-to-fight-back-against-public.shtml. 
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 This Essay reconstructs Gandhi‟s views on copyright law to show 
how it sits somewhat oddly with the abstract philosophical views on 
markets, ethics, and property that are often attributed to him. It then shows 
how contrary to common belief, Gandhi‟s engagement with the institution 
of copyright reveals a complex interplay of moral, political, ethical, and 
most importantly legal ideas, which the lore about his rejection of the 
institution fails to capture in any significant measure. It thus sets the stage 
for a broader examination of what Gandhi‟s views were on the normativity 
of law, and the unstated role he envisioned for legal reasoning and legal 
institutions in his overall world-view.  
Part I begins by setting out Gandhi‟s basic economic philosophy, 
and the simplistic view of copyright law that is commonly attributed to 
Gandhi. Focusing on his rejection of utilitarianism, markets, modernity and 
ownership as an autonomous ideal, Gandhi is thought to have rejected 
copyright law as alien to his thinking and belief.  
Part II then reveals that Gandhi‟s actual engagement with copyright 
departs from what an analysis of his abstract philosophy might have 
suggested. It reconstructs Gandhi‟s views on copyright law by focusing on 
his engagement with copyright between 1926 and 1946, the period when he 
wrote and published the most, bringing him into direct contact with the 
copyright system. Here we see three different strands of thinking (about 
copyright) motivating Gandhi‟s actions and beliefs. In the first, the strand of 
“personal rejection”, Gandhi‟s rhetoric adheres to the dominant belief set 
out in Part I—i.e., that of rejecting the institution in its entirety. Yet, even 
here what is often missed is that Gandhi‟s rejection of the institution was a 
deeply personal one, rather than one that he would advocate as a normative 
political matter for everyone, since he recognized and acknowledged that 
copyright‟s utilitarian purpose might have value for others. In the second, 
the strand of “reluctant engagement”, we see Gandhi willing to accept the 
limited utility of copyright for some purposes, including somewhat 
surprisingly, market-driven, distributive ones. In the third strand, that of 
“strategic deployment”, we see Gandhi actively using the institution of 
copyright law to further his other normative ideals—truth (integrity), 
expressive diversity, and ensuring that market motives do not crowd-out 
other non-market-based ones. 
Part III then argues that Gandhi‟s views on copyright law are best 
understood as a form of copyright pragmatism, an approach that draws on 
both philosophical and legal pragmatism, and that discussions of Gandhi‟s 
political and moral theories almost always ignore the likely effect that his 
training as a lawyer might have had on his views. It begins by showing the 
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intellectual, conceptual, and analytical parallels between Gandhi‟s own 
philosophy of action—practical idealism—and American pragmatism, as a 
philosophical and legal movement. It then unpacks copyright pragmatism to 
show how it relies on a nuanced, incremental approach to thinking about the 
institution‟s myriad costs and benefits, its fundamental problem of 
incommensurability, and indeed its normativity as a “legal” institution. It 
finally concludes by suggesting that copyright pragmatism might hold 
important structural (rather than substantive) lessons for contemporary 
debates about the proper scope and purposes of copyright law. 
 
 
I. THE MYTH OF GANDHI AS A COPYRIGHT NIHILIST  
 
 As noted earlier, the standard observation to come out of the failed 
attempt to extend the copyright in Gandhi‟s work was that Gandhi was 
somehow opposed to the institution of copyright and rejected its value. 
Opposition to copyright is hardly new, and has assumed some significance 
in the last decade or so, as the infamous “copyright wars” have entered the 
public spotlight.
25
 Leaving aside the validity or otherwise of these 
arguments in opposition, the story about Gandhi‟s rejection seemed to ally 
his economic thinking with the idea that copyright was morally wrong, and 
worthy of rejection. In this Part, I disaggregate this facially intuitive 
connection to show how Gandhi‟s supposed rejection of copyright actually 
sat rather well with his views on the market, utilitarianism, property, and 
modernity—a position that the simplified accounts of his opposition to 
copyright all too readily accept. In the next Part, I show how this simplified 
account doesn‟t at all capture Gandhi‟s actual views and actions on the 
subject, which as Part III shows, originated in his theory of action, which 
was overtly pragmatic and contextual in orientation. 
 
A. Gandhi‟s Economic Philosophy 
 
 To fully explicate Gandhi‟s economic ideas with any measure of 
brevity is a challenge. For one, Gandhi never developed his abstract 
philosophy (economic or otherwise) in a coherent and comprehensive 
manner, which required scholars to piece them together from his several 
writings over extended periods time. Additionally and as many scholars 
have noted, Gandhi‟s economic thinking drew in large measure from his 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note __. 
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spiritual, religious, ethical, and moral philosophy.
26
 Consequently, cabining 
his economic ideas and studying them in isolation is likely to render them 
both incomplete and on occasion incomprehensible. Despite these 
challenges however, this Section attempts to provide a short overview of 
four ideas that were central to Gandhi‟s economic philosophy, which on the 
face of things suggest an oppositional stand towards copyright, and feed 
into the myth of his being a copyright nihilist.  
 
1. The Rejection of Utilitarianism 
 
Of the various aspects of Gandhi‟s economic thinking, his rejection 
of utilitarianism is perhaps the best known, and commonly thought to have 
formed an organizing principle in his own economic thinking.
27
 This is at 
best an incomplete account of how Gandhi developed his own economic 
philosophy, for, while he certainly rejected utilitarianism, his basis for 
doing so wasn‟t because he was altogether opposed to consequentialist 
approaches to reason and action, but rather because of utilitarianism‟s 
fundamental inability to accommodate the ethical ideas that Gandhi 
believed ought to be central to all normative justifications of human action 
and behavior.  
The version of utilitarianism that Gandhi routinely criticized was the 
simplistic version, best captured by the phrase “the greatest good of the 
greatest number”, which he associated with Jeremy Bentham.
28
 Gandhi‟s 
objections to basic utilitarianism had two independent bases. First, he was 
dissatisfied with simple utilitarianism‟s willful antipathy towards 
distributive questions, given its singular focus on maximizing aggregate 
welfare or happiness.
29
 Gandhi was thus intolerant of the idea that for the 
benefit of a majority, a minority of society could have their interests and 
welfare altogether ignored, not just in practice, but additionally as a matter 
of principle.
30
 Second, he viewed utilitarianism—to the extent that it was a 
                                                          
26 See AJIT K. DASGUPTA, GANDHI‟S ECONOMIC THOUGHT 7-12 (1996). 
27 Rivett, supra note __, at 1-2. 
28 See Mahatma Gandhi, Letter to Jal A.D. Naoroji, in 55 CWMG, supra note __, at 481, 482. 
29 DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 8-9. It is crucial to emphasize here that Gandhi‟s discomfort with 
utilitarianism didn‟t consider subsequent modifications of utilitarian thinking, which allow room for 
important distributive and egalitarian considerations. Scholars have indeed shown how utilitarianism, 
even in the versions put forth by Bentham and Mill, remains capable of accommodating the rights 
and concerns of minorities. See FREDERICK ROSEN, CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM FROM HUME TO MILL 
232-44 (2003). Gandhi‟s rejection of utilitarianism was thus hardly a scholarly one, and relied on a 
simplistic, and somewhat caricatured version of the philosophy. 
30 SHANTI S. GUPTA, THE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY OF MAHATMA GANDHI 42 (1994). 
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normative theory for action—to be morally and ethically vacuous. Speaking 
of utilitarianism, as commonly advocated, he thus observes how 
“[h]appiness is taken to mean material happiness exclusively, that is 
economic prosperity,” which implies that “[i]f in the pursuit of this 
happiness, moral laws are violated, it does not matter much.
31
” 
 Gandhi‟s objections to utilitarianism appear to however have a 
common origin: utilitarianism‟s willingness to distance individual and 
aggregate welfare from each other not just as a descriptive matter, but as a 
normative principle. It certainly wasn‟t that Gandhi didn‟t care about 
“welfare”. To the contrary, Gandhi remained committed to welfare, but he 
insisted that it originate in an intense focus on how individuals motivate 
themselves, instead of taking that as a given and attempting to aggregate it 
in the abstract. Gandhi‟s own idea of welfare is captured to some degree in 
his principle of sarvodaya, which translates to the uplift (or welfare) of 
all.
32
 In his rendering of the idea, Gandhi‟s identifies three principles, and 
the first of these is the recognition that “the good of the individual is 
contained in the good of all.
33
” Instead of viewing individual welfare as 
likely furthered through an aggregation of social welfare—a deductive 
approach—Gandhi‟s conception of welfare was an inductive one that treats 
collective social welfare as a central normative tenet of how the very idea of 
individual welfare ought to be conceptualized. Rather than taking it as a 
given and attempting to maximize it, Gandhi sought to inject substantive 
content into it, by connecting it to his ethical theory of behavior. The failure 
to add normative content to the idea of „welfare,‟ was to Gandhi a reflection 
of the moral vacuity of standard utilitarian thinking. A theory of action—
especially one purporting to be normative—had to focus not just on 
individual action, but on the “right” individual action that society ought to 
care about.
34
 This in turn necessitated seeing individual and social welfare 
as intricately connected to each other.
35
  
                                                          
31 Gandhi, Letter to Jal A.D. Naoroji, supra note __, at 482. 
32 See GANDHI, SARVODAYA, supra note __, at 4. 
33 GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note __, at 299. 
34 DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 10; UNTO TAHTINEN, THE CORE OF GANDHI‟S PHILOSOPHY 38-39 
(1979). 
35 Gandhi‟s objection to utilitarianism is in many ways similar to Bernard Williams‟ criticism of 
utilitarianism as a stand-alone philosophy. In his famous attack on utilitarianism, Williams too 
criticizes utilitarianism for its reliance on what he calls the notion of “negative responsibility”. J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 93 (1973). According to Williams, 
utilitarianism is content with its focus on particular states of affairs and pays no attention to 
distinguishing between specific actions that bring about those states of affairs, and indeed the 
morality of those actions. In the process, it underplays the idea of moral agency and the fact that 
individuals do and should take responsibility for their actions and the consequences that they 
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In summary then, Gandhi did reject utilitarianism. Yet, he didn‟t 
construct his own philosophy in opposition to utilitarianism. His rejection of 
utilitarianism did not form the basis for his development of his thinking 
about welfare, but was instead a consequence of his own philosophy that 
required a richer normative account of individual action and its morality. 
 
2. Preference Limiting 
 
Gandhi‟s rejection of utilitarianism was thus a natural consequence 
of his own moral vision of the role that individual behavior and action 
played in society, and how it ought to be channeled. Gandhi‟s normative 
economic philosophy was additionally deeply informed by his ethical vision 
of society and individual behavior therein.
36
 This in turn produced two 
important characteristics. The first is the fact that the economic dimension 
of Gandhi‟s philosophy is often difficult to separate from its ethical 
dimension, and indeed in numerous instances the economic dimension of 
his philosophy is derived as a by-product of the ethical vision. Gandhi 
himself often observed that he did “not draw a sharp distinction between 
economics and ethics.
37
”  
The second feature, which also derives from Gandhi‟s ethical vision, 
is the fact that despite the fact that his economic account is rooted in an 
ethical one, the normative significance of the theory/philosophy is only ever 
meant to be realized through internal and not external motivations. Gandhi 
in other words, believed that adherence to the ethical and economic vision 
he was advocating would come about through individuals‟ self-realization 
of its virtues, and never in a top-down or coercive manner.
38
 Accepting his 
normative precepts was thus a deeply personal act, and Gandhi believed that 
he could bring about this self-realization through example and 
                                                                                                                                                   
produce, what Williams refers to as the value of “integrity”. Id. at 108. Where Gandhi and Williams 
possibly diverge however is in their orientation. Williams‟ objection to utilitarianism is a largely 
theoretical one, which explains why much of his criticism of utilitarianism routinely translates into a 
criticism of all consequentialism, in his own account. To Gandhi however, the critique of 
utilitarianism was practically motivated, allowing him to embrace a consequentialist orientation in 
other contexts.  
36 See OM PRAKASH MISRA, ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF GANDHI AND NEHRU: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
14 (1995); DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 7. 
37 Mahatma Gandhi, The Great Sentinel, in 24 CWMG, supra note __, at 412, 415. 
38 See DENNIS DALTON, MAHATMA GANDHI: NONVIOLENT POWER IN ACTION 6 (2012); S.K. Saxena, 
The Fabric of Self-Suffering: A Study in Gandhi, 12 REL. STUD. 239 (1976). 
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elaboration—which perhaps accounts for why he continually reasoned 
publicly through his numerous, often contradictory, actions.
39
  
One of the fundamental ways in which Gandhi‟s ethical vision 
informed his economic ideas relates to his views on individual preferences 
and wants.
40
 To Gandhi, conspicuous consumption was morally 
reprehensible, and he argued that an individual‟s welfare is best achieved 
through limiting the wants and desires that an individual has and develops 
over the course of his or her life.
41
 To him, once the idea of “maximizing” 
one‟s wants entered the picture, it was likely to take on a life of its own, 
producing a sense of restlessness that might induce unreflective behavior 
among individuals. Contentment was thus a core tenet of Gandhi‟s vision of 
happiness, which necessitated not the maximization of wants and 
preferences, but rather limiting them. As a leading scholar of Gandhi‟s 
economic ideas Ajit Dasgupta observes of Gandhi‟s thinking in this area: 
“self-indulgence and the ceaseless multiplication of wants hamper one‟s 
growth because they are erosive of contentment, personal autonomy, self-
respect and peace of mind…it is from these that one‟s long-run happiness 
can be found, not just from obtaining what one likes at the moment.
42
” 
Preference-satisfaction, the organizing ideal of utilitarianism was a 
misguided idea to Gandhi, in whose philosophy, this satisfaction always 
needed to have an outer limit. 
Preference limiting was thus to Gandhi a virtue that individuals 
needed to cultivate, and which when realized would contribute to overall 
social welfare through the interplay between individual and collective well-
being. Such limiting had to come from within each individual for it to serve 
its true purpose. 
 
3. Markets and Modernity 
 
 Flowing directly from his rejection of utilitarianism and the idea of 
preference limitation, Gandhi‟s economic philosophy was rooted in a 
                                                          
39 GLYN RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF GANDHI: A STUDY OF HIS BASIC IDEAS 51 (1995) (noting 
Gandhi‟s emphasis on “persuasive reasoning” and “voluntary suffering” as the twin bases of 
convincing an opponent). 
40 DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 14; GUPTA, supta note __, at 4-13;  
41 GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note __, at 8-9; GANDHI, INDIAN HOME RULE, supra note __, at 37; 
Mahatma Gandhi, Who Can Offer Satyagraha?, in 9 CWMG, supra note __, at 339, 342 
(“Contentment is happiness.”). 
42 DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 15. 
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fundamental opposition to what he called “modern civilization,
43
” 
characterized by industrialization, an exclusive focus on the material (as 
opposed to moral) advancement of society, and the unending multiplication 
of wants.
44
 The market and market forces were to Gandhi mechanisms that 
reinforced modern civilization. In Gandhi‟s philosophy, the market was a 
mechanism of greed and selfishness, which while advancing material 
prosperity, always compromised the moral and ethical dimensions of social 
existence.
45
 Market competition was thus described as one of the “most 
inhuman among the maxims laid down by modern economics”.
46
 Adam 
Smith‟s basic tenets were thus to Gandhi deeply “disturbing” and needed to 
be “overcome” by society.
47
 
 Gandhi‟s vitriolic attack on markets and modern civilization was 
likely in large measure a response to colonial rule that merged the political 
ideals of imperialism with the economic goals of capitalism.
48
 From this, it 
is commonly assumed that Gandhi was sympathetic to the communist and 
socialist ideas—of Marxism—that had begun to take shape and gain 
prominence in Russia. Yet, his merger of means and ends in action forced 
him to part ways with communism as a philosophy, to the extent that it 
relied on violence to achieve its goals.
49
 Gandhi also saw the traditional 
brand of normative communism as premised on the same kinds of beliefs 
about human behavior as market capitalism—that individuals were selfish, 
greedy, and consumption-driven.50  
Indeed in some ways, Gandhi‟s rejection of Marx‟s traditional 
communism was inevitable in that it portrayed Indian civilization—prior to 
the advent of the British—as barbaric and without any rational or logical 
basis. Writing about the British rule in India, Karl Marx had in 1853 
observed that the “English interference [in India]… dissolved these small 
semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, by blowing up their 
economical basis, and thus produced the greatest, and to speak the truth, the 
                                                          
43 GANDHI, INDIAN HOME RULE, supra note __, at 6, 39 (“This booklet is a severe condemnation of 
„modern civilization‟.”). See also RAJESHWAR PANDEY, GANDHI AND MODERNISATION 23 (1979). 
44 Kazuyi Ishii, The Socioeconomic Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi: As an Origin of Alternative 
Development, 59 REV. SOC. ECON. 297, 299 (2001). 
45 Id. at 299; see Mahatma Gandhi, Speech at Muir College Economic Society, Allahabad, in 15 
CWMG, supra note __, at 272, 277. 
46 Mahatma Gandhi, The Secret of It, in 25 CWMG, supra note __, at 12, 16. 
47 Mahatma Gandhi, Interview to Khadi Workers, 64 CWMG, supra note __, at 339, 339. 
48 See Ishii, supra note __, at 299-300. 
49 GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note __, at 56-57. 
50 Id. at 56-58. 
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only social revolution ever heard of in Asia.
51
” Whereas communism saw 
the development of state collective ownership as an advancement over both 
capitalism and traditional society, in Gandhi‟s philosophy, returning the 
country to its pre-British glory and philosophy was a central, motivating 
idea.
52
 
Reviving village communities, and the structures of living that 
existed there was critical to Gandhi. In it, he saw the possible realization of 
his ethical and moral goals for Indian society, and perhaps most importantly 
a revival of Indian identity that would make the ethical component of his 
project more likely.
53
 The logic for this move originated in his idea of self-
rule, or swadeshi, where he sought to ensure that the Indian economy was 
internally self-sufficient, such that it would not need to depend on the 
outside world for its existence.
54
 In this idea, Gandhi seemed to suggest that 
it was the absence of such reliance that had allowed the British to colonize 
India, and that unless India regained its self-reliance after their departure, 
the country continued to risk re-colonization and serial exploitation by 
market driven imperialist countries.
55
 Markets and modernization were thus 
to him, regressive devices. 
  
4. Property and Trusteeship  
 
The last tenet of Gandhi‟s economic ideas that is of relevance to our 
discussion of copyright is Gandhi‟s concept of “trusteeship,” which he 
advocated as a substitute for the institution of private property ownership, 
as traditionally understood.
56
 Building on his disavowal of markets, 
utilitarianism, self-interested behavior and modernity, Gandhi drew from 
communism the idea that the concentration of material wealth in the hands 
of a few was a recipe for social and economic exploitation. As some 
scholars have observed, Gandhi very likely developed the idea of 
trusteeship from his knowledge of the law of trusts and the notion of 
                                                          
51 Karl Marx, The British Rule in India, N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, June 10, 1853, at 125, 132. 
52 Ishii, supra note __, at 302, 307-11. 
53 Mahatma Gandhi, A Discussion with Maurice Frydman, in 69 CWMG, supra note __, at 320, 321 
(“[I]f the village perishes, India will perish too.”). 
54 See GANDHI, INDIAN HOME RULE, supra note __, at 173-74. 
55 Ishii, supra note __, at 302-03. 
56 See generally GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note __; ARCHNA KAPOOR, GANDHI‟S TRUSTEESHIP: 
CONCEPT AND RELEVANCE (1993); M.L. Dantwala, The Trusteeship Formula, in GANDHI AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 141 (B.P. Pandey ed., 1991); B.K. Roy Burman, Gandhi‟s Concept of 
Trusteeship: A Dimension of Socialist Humanism, in GANDHI AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 171 
(B.P. Pandey ed., 1991).  
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fiduciary obligations that trust law imposes on trustees.
57
 Under his 
conception of trusteeship, property owners were to remain in possession of 
their wealth and assets, could use whatever is reasonably needed by them 
for their “personal need,” and then will act as trustees over the rest and use 
it for the benefit of society at large.
58
 Property owners were thus to put a 
limit on their behavior that was motivated exclusively by their self-
interest.
59
 In this institution, we thus see elements of Gandhi‟s other 
economic principles, most notably the idea of limiting one‟s wants. 
What is perhaps most interesting about Gandhi‟s idea of trusteeship 
is the reality that Gandhi himself viewed it as more of a theory, or ideal, 
rather than as a workable movement or plan.
60
 He routinely described it as a 
“legal fiction” or “abstraction,” but noted that “if we strive for it we shall be 
able to go further in realizing a state of equality on earth than by any other 
method.
61
” It was thus an aspirational ideal that was worthy of emphasis as 
a motivational principal. 
In addition, it is also important to note that trusteeship did not entail 
the wholesale rejection of property, or indeed the renunciation of all wealth 
and possessions by the wealthy.
62
 Trusteeship represented a form of 
ownership, which cast affirmative, other-regarding, communal obligations 
on owners. Individuals in possession of wealth, or those engaged in the 
business of making wealth (i.e., businessmen) weren‟t required to renounce 
their assets in favor of others. They were instead merely required to hold 
these assets—or at least some part of them—as custodians for society.
63
  
Summarizing trusteeship, Gandhi thus observed that “[i]t does not 
recognize any right of private ownership of property, except in as much as it 
may be permitted by society for its own welfare.
64
” In this formulation, we 
                                                          
57 See, e.g., DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 23; Geeta Abrol, Gandhian Doctrine of Trusteeship and its 
Relevance to Modern Times, in GANDHIAN THOUGHT AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 147 (J.S. Mathur 
ed., 1974). 
58 GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note __, at 72. 
59 Id. at 73-75. 
60 Gandhi‟s book on the subject describes it as a “theory”. See generally id. 
61 Mahatma Gandhi, Interview to Nirmal Kumar Bose, in 65 CWMG, supra note __, at 316, 318. He 
thus notes: 
You may say that trusteeship is a legal fiction. But if people meditate over it constantly and 
try to act up to it, then life on earth would be governed far more by love than it is at present. 
Absolute trusteeship is an abstraction like Euclid‟s definition of a point, and is equally 
unattainable.  
62 GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note __, at 94 (“Legal ownership in the transformed condition [of 
trusteeship] vests in the trustee, not in the State.”). 
63 Id. at 94-95. 
64 Id. at 102. 
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see three important analytical and conceptual moves. First, it isn‟t an 
absolute rejection of private property. Instead, it subjects the institution to a 
consequentialist purpose—social welfare. What is clearly rejected in this 
formulation is the idea of property as an individual‟s “despotic dominion.
65
” 
Second and connectedly, by rendering the entire institution subject to social 
welfare as a litmus test, Gandhi is indirectly rejecting the idea that property 
rights originate in natural law or that they are naturally given and in some 
sense pre-state, an idea today associated with Locke.
66
 Third, what Gandhi 
seems to be rejecting—in addition to an absolute conception of property—is 
also the idea of private ownership being a “right”.
67
 To Gandhi, the 
essentialism of rights was a dangerous phenomenon, because it distanced 
the entitlement from its correlative duties, which to him formed the basis for 
organizing and motivating behavior among social actors.
68
 To the extent 
that private ownership was a valid institution to Gandhi, it revolved around 
the affirmative obligations cast on owners to look out for and act in the 
interest of those without wealth and assets, the central idea behind 
trusteeship.
69
 
 
B. Gandhi‟s Purported Rejection of Copyright 
 
 Putting these elements of Gandhi‟s socio-economic philosophy 
together, it is easy to see why the idea that he “opposed” copyright in its 
entirety seems plausible. Gandhi‟s writings on social welfare, utilitarianism, 
ethics, markets, and property rights seemed to undoubtedly question the 
                                                          
65 An idea traced back to the English common law theorist William Blackstone. 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. It is of course debatable what exactly it meant, beyond being an 
interesting metaphor. See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone‟s Anxiety, 108 
YALE L.J. 601 (1998). 
66 See generally JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 
(1980) (providing an extended discussion of Locke‟s theory of property). 
67 GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note __, at 100 (“[R]ights that do not not flow directly from duty 
well-performed, are not worth having.”). To some, Gandhi is taken to have consciously avoided a 
theory of rights. See Ronald J. Terchek, Gandhi and Moral Autonomy, 13 GANDHI MARG 454 (1992). 
But see DASGUPTA, supra note __, at 45 (suggesting that Gandhi did have a conception of rights, but 
that they took second-place to duties).  
68 Mahatma Gandhi, Presidential Address at Kathiawar Political Conference, Bhavanagar, in 30 
CWMG, supra note __, at 53, 68 (“The true source of rights is duty”); Mahatma Gandhi, Talk with 
Workers of Rajkot Praja Parishad, in 75 CWMG, supra note __, at 175, 176 (“[T]he right to perform 
one‟s duties is the only right that is worth living for and dying for.”); Mahatma Gandhi, Letter to 
Julian Huxley, in 97 CWMG, supra note __, at 99 (expressing skepticism about the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and noting that “[t]he very right to live accrues to us only when we do 
the duty of the citizenship of the world”). 
69 See GANDHI, TRUSTEESHIP, supra note 102-03. 
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theoretical and practical bases of copyright law. Together with the growing 
emphasis on the public domain among scholars at the time that his works 
entered the public domain,
70
 and the public perception that the copyright 
system served the interests of no more than a few groups of commercially 
powerful creators,
71
 Gandhi came to be idolized in the public mind as 
championing the anti-copyright movement well before its heyday. To 
scholars familiar with both Gandhi‟s economic philosophy and the basics of 
copyright law, this would have seemed largely unexceptional. 
 First, copyright law in most of the common law world—including 
British (and later, independent) India—is commonly understood as 
originating in utilitarianism.
72
 Copyright is justified in this understanding as 
an inducement for creativity. By providing authors and creators with a 
limited, market-based monopoly over their works—manifested in a set of 
exclusive rights that subsist for a fixed period of time—copyright is 
believed to incentivize the very production of such expression.
73
 This 
production of expression, it is in turn believed, will contribute to “learning” 
and the “progress” of society. Indeed, the world‟s first copyright statute, the 
Statute of Anne, described itself as “[a]n Act for the [e]ncouragement of 
[l]earning,” an idea that finds mention in the first U.S. copyright statute as 
well.
74
 The utilitarian logic underlying copyright is taken to manifest itself 
in the idea that more expressive creativity benefits society as a whole, 
regardless of how those benefits are ultimately distributed. Aggregate social 
welfare is thus the operating principle behind it. To the extent then that one 
adopts such an outlook towards copyright,
75
 the institution unquestionably 
sits at odds with Gandhi‟s deep discomfort with utilitarianism and its facial 
agnosticism towards distributive and ethical questions. 
                                                          
70 For an overview of this trend, and a critique of it see: Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The 
Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1333-35 (2004). 
71 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY (2005) 
(detailing “how big media uses technology and the law lock down culture and control creativity”). 
72 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 
1576 (2009). 
73 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003). 
74 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1709) (Eng.) (preamble); Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.  
75 It is worth emphasizing that copyright‟s utilitarian justification is hardly axiomatic, despite its 
dominance in the scholarly literature and judicial opinions. Scholars have in recent times questioned 
its fundamental premise from a variety of approaches. See, e.g., MADHAVI SUNDEER, FROM GOODS TO 
A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 3 (2012); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmermann, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN 
THE L. 29 (2011). 
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 Second, copyright‟s idea of “inducing” creativity is indelibly 
premised on the twin principles of preference satisfaction and wealth-
maximization. The operating belief underlying copyright‟s theory of 
incentives is that individual authors and creators are rational economic 
actors who are motivated in large measure, if not entirely, by the urge to 
maximize their own self-interest via the market.
76
 Copyright law plays into 
that belief by fuelling the assumption that preferences can be satisfied 
without a pre-determined outer boundary. The urge to maximize their own 
personal welfare thus motivates creators to produce expressive work. 
Gandhi‟s ethical ideal of limiting one‟s preferences and wants thus stands in 
strong contrast to copyright‟s operating assumptions about individual 
behavior—that it relies on both as a positive and normative matter. 
 Third, as a market-based mechanism copyright was and is 
undoubtedly a modern institution. Given his focus on returning India to its 
traditional “Indian” ways by idealizing village communities and their 
collective practices, Gandhi might have—the argument goes—very likely 
seen copyright as largely irrelevant, and perhaps even incompatible with 
traditional, collective living. Whether empirically accurate or not, Gandhi 
took traditional values and actions to emphasize self-sufficiency, sharing, 
and spiritual/ethical motivation.
77
 Copyright, which emerged in the 
industrial-era and in response to the mechanization of the printing 
industry,
78
 would have, based on his abstract economic ideas, very likely 
seemed to him to be incompatible with his vision that the essence of India 
was to be found in its villages. 
 Fourth, copyright has always been structured as an institution of 
private ownership.
79
 Regardless of whether copyright thinking ought to 
emphasize its nascent similarity to other real and personal property 
institutions, it remains a reality that copyright‟s structure of exclusive rights 
is modeled on the property‟s idea of exclusion. As discussed earlier, Gandhi 
saw private ownership as a necessary evil. He viewed it as an institution 
that couldn‟t be rejected, but one that at the same time didn‟t have to be 
encouraged. It was to him worthy of serious internal reform by altering the 
core ideas motivating its functioning—i.e., the idea of trusteeship. In light 
of these beliefs, and copyright‟s nature as an ownership interest, it is thus 
                                                          
76 See Balganesh, supra note __, at 1573. 
77 See generally M.K. GANDHI, VILLAGE SWARAJ (1962). 
78 See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) (describing the 
origins of copyright and its relationship to the printing industry). 
79 Id. at 1 (noting how it emerged as a regime of “literary property”). 
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easy to see why Gandhi‟s reluctant acceptance of private property might 
have translated into an opposition to the institution of copyright. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 In short then, Gandhi‟s abstract economic philosophy contains 
innumerable strands that corroborate the belief that he rejected copyright as 
an institution. Yet, in so situating copyright within the skein of his overall 
economic ideas, what is all too easily forgotten is that the reality that 
Gandhi himself engaged the institution of copyright law over the course of 
his lifetime. During these engagements, we see emerge a picture that is very 
different from the one that a bare reliance on his abstract socio-economic 
thinking might have suggested.  
  
 
II. GANDHI‟S INTERACTIONS WITH COPYRIGHT LAW  
 
 Leaving Gandhi‟s abstract economic ideas to one side, and focusing 
instead on actual events during his lifetime, reveals that he came into 
contact with the copyright system on several occasions. During each of 
these instances, his interaction with copyright remained markedly different 
from what his abstract thinking might have suggested it would be. Besides 
diverging from his abstract thinking—that rejected utilitarianism and 
market-based mechanisms—Gandhi‟s views on copyright law also 
underwent a gradual transformation over time, as his engagement with the 
institution became from recurrent. This Part reconstructs both this 
divergence and transformation. 
 Gandhi‟s views on copyright, as described in the Part, are like his 
abstract philosophy, contained in his writing and correspondence that is 
scattered over a period of time. Yet, what distinguishes his views on 
copyright from other aspects of his philosophy is that these views were 
driven almost entirely by individual events and occurrences that forced him 
to confront many of copyright‟s actual costs and benefits. They were thus 
motivated by practical necessity, endowing them with a situational 
authenticity despite their episodic nature. In this sense then, his views on 
copyright are real and revealed, rather than merely philosophical and stated. 
Section II.A sets out the gradual transformation of his views over time, 
while II.B attempts to synthesize them. 
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A. Three Strands of Thinking 
 
 The reconstruction of Gandhi‟s views on copyright in this Section 
focuses on the period between 1926 and 1946—since it is during this time 
that Gandhi‟s writing and publishing brought him into close contact with 
the copyright system, and forced him to confront its possible interaction 
with the goals of the Indian freedom movement, which he was at the time 
fully immersed in. Gandhi‟s views on copyright law during this period 
reveal three related, but nonetheless distinct strands of thinking. The first, 
the strand of personal rejection, saw him building on the ideas and beliefs 
that motivated his socio-economic thinking to emphasize his outright 
rejection of the copyright system, just as the Navjivan Trust imputed to him 
in 2009. In the second, the strand of reluctant engagement, Gandhi‟s 
emphatic rejection begins to whittle away as he sees the possible benefits 
that engaging the copyright system might hold for him and his goals during 
the period. Finally in the third, the strand of strategic deployment, Gandhi 
embraced the copyright system. Yet he continued to disagree with many of 
its fundamental tenets and effects, and thus attempted to subvert them from 
inside the system rather than from the outside. 
 An important observation is in order before proceeding to an 
analysis of each of these strands. While the three strands described in this 
Section do in some sense represent a sequence, as temporal categories they 
remain far from watertight. Their episodic and situational nature by 
necessity allowed for a good deal of overlap, despite there being a general 
transformation over time. One could certainly characterize these overlaps as 
„contradictions‟. Yet, I argue that they are likely better understood as 
representing an evolution, albeit a non-linear one, in Gandhi‟s views. A 
contradiction, by its very nature, connotes a situation where a person makes 
inconsistent claims, with little effort to reconcile them. Gandhi by contrast 
fully recognized that he was changing his position on copyright over time. 
Not only does his writing reveal a deep discomfort with these changes, but 
Gandhi himself goes to great lengths to account for the change, and to 
explain them in evolutionary terms. To simplistically suggest that they were 
thus mere contradictions is to ignore the richness of this exercise in 
practical, situation-specific reasoning that Gandhi undertook to account for 
the evolution of his beliefs over time. Part III discusses the implications of 
this evolutionary reading in greater detail. 
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1. Strand One: Personal Rejection 
 
Gandhi‟s earliest encounters with copyright conform to his views on 
utilitarianism and markets, discussed earlier. In it, we see a strong sense of 
discomfort with copyright‟s basic structure: of allowing authors (or 
copyright owners) to assert their exclusive rights in order to create a 
situation of artificial scarcity for the expression, which would in turn 
facilitate a market for such expressive works. The discomfort that we see in 
Gandhi though is hardly visceral or unreasoned, but instead suggests a 
rejection of copyright‟s goals because of the assumptions about behavior 
that it relies on, which Gandhi seemed to believe were inapplicable to him. 
This last point is particularly important, because while Gandhi remained 
uneasy about copyright early on, this unease never manifested itself in 
anything beyond a personal rejection of copyright in his works.
80
 This 
personal rejection is to be contrasted with other instances, where Gandhi‟s 
rejection was in the form of an “opposition” to a law.
81
 In the latter set of 
situations, Gandhi questioned the very moral legitimacy of the law, and his 
opposition was directed at the repeal (or abolition) of the law altogether—
under the idea of lex iniusta non est lex.
82
 This was far from being the case 
in his discomfort with copyright law. 
The earliest evidence we have of Gandhi‟s interaction with 
copyright law comes from 1910, and his first published book: Hind Swaraj, 
which translates to “Indian Home Rule”.
83
 On the title page of the first 
edition of the book, the line “No Rights Reserved” features rather 
prominently.
84
 It is crucial to note that Gandhi was yet to return to India at 
the time of its publication, and was deeply immersed in the Indian 
nationalist movement from South Africa. In recent work, Isabel Hofmeyr 
argues that Gandhi‟s decision to avoid asserting copyright in the book was a 
conscious one, aimed at ensuring that the book didn‟t become just another 
                                                          
80 The idea of personal rejection emanates in large measure from Gandhi‟s overall philosophy of 
political action, to be found in his idea of satyagraha, or non-violent resistance. Central to 
satyagraha was the idea of self-sacrifice, which connects back to the idea of personal action forming 
a basis for others to follow suit. See M.K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 47 (1961). 
81 This was a central component of satyagraha, where Gandhi advocated the mass, but non-violent 
disobedience of an immoral or illegitimate law. See GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 
__, at iv. He developed this approach in South Africa for the first time, and employed it routinely 
during the Indian freedom movement. Id. 
82 Translating to “unjust law is no law”, a phrase commonly attributed to Saint Augustine. See Andrei 
Marmor, The Nature of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/.  
83 See MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, INDIAN HOME RULE (1910)  
84 Id. 
              GANDHI AND COPYRIGHT PRAGMATISM                           
 
 
23 
commodity.
85
 It was instead motivated by his attempt to treat the production 
and consumption of books as a “continuous ethical community in which 
printers, authors, and readers become comrades.
86
” In the preface to the first 
edition, which he published independently in a newspaper, Gandhi notes 
that the book draws heavily from materials (“authorities”) that he had read 
in the past, and that he was “lay[ing] no claim to originality” in its 
content.
87
 What this perhaps suggests then is that Gandhi‟s decision to 
avoid asserting copyright may have also been motivated by his own sense 
of its authorial origins. Additionally, the fact that the Government of India, 
i.e., “His Majesty” at the time, had at the time found the book to be 
“seditious” and declared this edition (along with a series of other 
publications by the International Printing Press) to “have been forfeited,” 
may have prompted Gandhi to avoid asserting rights that would have had to 
originate in the Crown to begin with.
88
  
Gandhi‟s first substantive interaction with the institution of 
copyright law appears to have been in 1926, by which time he had returned 
to India and was fully immersed in the freedom struggle.
89
 A few years 
prior to this, Gandhi had commenced work on his autobiography, titled The 
Story of My Experiments with Truth. While Gandhi had intended for it to be 
eventually published as a book, he published installments of the 
autobiography in the journals that he ran: Navjivan and Young India.
90
 The 
former published the chapters in Gujarati, Gandhi‟s native language, and 
the one in which he initially wrote; while the latter published Gandhi‟s own 
English translations of the Gujarati versions. By this time, Gandhi had risen 
in prominence in the Indian freedom movement, and was seen as its leader. 
Gandhi‟s autobiography was thus hugely popular among readers, even prior 
to its completion.
91
 
In order to popularize the message contained in these various 
installments, Gandhi readily announced that other newspapers were allowed 
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to reproduce the chapters in their entirety without any problem.
92
 As was to 
be expected, numerous English and local language newspapers began to do 
so, largely in order to raise their readership and circulation. Being 
commercially driven, most of these newspapers relied heavily on 
advertising revenue for their sustenance. As this practice (of reproducing his 
installments) began to gain prominence several of Gandhi‟s followers, most 
of who subscribed to his abstract socio-economic philosophy, began to find 
it problematic.
93
 Gandhi‟s writing, they believed, was now being used by 
newspapers for palpably commercial, market-driven reasons, which was 
fundamentally opposed to Gandhi‟s philosophy. They thus called on Gandhi 
to “exercise the copyright” in his work and prevent commercially-motivated 
newspapers from reproducing installments of his autobiography.
94
 Gandhi‟s 
response to this request is reflective of his discomfort with copyright. While 
acknowledging the reasons for the advice, Gandhi rejected it, and observed: 
 
I have never yet copyright any of my writings….Writings in the journals 
which I have the privilege of editing must be common property. Copyright 
is not a natural thing. It is a modern institution, perhaps desirable to a 
certain extent. But I have no wish to inflate the circulation of Young India 
or Navjivan by forbidding newspapers to copy the chapters of the 
autobiography.
95
 
 
In this open letter, we see Gandhi‟s first direct observations on the 
institution of copyright. He observes that his decision to avoid copyrighting 
any of his prior work had indeed been a conscious one. Copyright is seen as 
a “modern” as opposed to natural institution, and given his known 
discomfort with modernity, the binary is being used in a largely pejorative 
sense. Yet, his discomfort with the institution seems nonetheless measured. 
Instead of questioning its desirability in the abstract, he seems to be 
suggesting in this passage that his rejection is a largely personal one, driven 
by his own values and beliefs. There remains a noticeable avoidance of 
abstract moral principle, stated in categorical form (for example, of the kind 
“copyright ought to be avoided”). In it we see a unique approach that 
Gandhi adopted in his actions, which philosopher Akeel Bilgrami describes 
as the rejection of “universalizability,” the idea that if a person holds a 
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particular moral value, then he must think it applicable to others.
96
 This 
rejection implies that Gandhi didn‟t believe the idea (or principle) to have 
relevance for others as an “imperative;” it was instead to motivate others 
through example.
97
 Convincing by example was thus the causal mechanism 
that Gandhi envisaged for most of his principles, and his rejection of 
copyright was in that sense personal in structure, but nonetheless exemplary 
in function. 
In this observation, Gandhi also hints at the possibility of his 
position changing, in his emphasis on “yet”.
98
 Also significant in this 
observation is his recognition that copyright‟s fundamental operating 
premise is the creation of an artificial scarcity through its framework of 
exclusivity. His refusal to assert copyright thus represents not just an 
unwillingness to utilize a modern, artificial institution, but additionally a 
recognition that if he were to invoke copyright law, he would be directly 
expanding the market for his own versions of the chapters, which he was 
equally uncomfortable with.  
The „personal‟ nature of Gandhi‟s rejection of copyright would 
remain an important baseline during the rest of his life, and appears as a 
constant refrain in his articulations on the topic. Even when he would later 
come to accept copyright for limited purposes and deploy it strategically, 
we see him referring back to this baseline continually, in order to emphasize 
his discomfort with such acceptance and to restrain it.
99
 Gandhi seems to 
have adhered to the ideal of personal rejection as an abstract principle even 
after he embraced copyright for limited purposes following the publication 
of his autobiography. In relation to the newspaper articles that he continued 
to write, he thus continued to assert his personal rejection of copyright law. 
When approached by publishers seeking to translate his letters into other 
languages, he routinely replied that he “claim[ed] copyright for none of 
[his] publications”, but insisted that the translation not depart from the 
original.
100
 As we shall see, this latter point would eventually force Gandhi 
to embrace copyright for a limited purpose. 
In adopting the baseline of rejection, albeit as a personal matter, it is 
important to appreciate that Gandhi‟s unwillingness to invoke copyright in 
his works wasn‟t because he was completely opposed to the idea of paying 
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for knowledge and information. This is another common misconception 
about Gandhi‟s views on copyright. While he was opposed to market 
mechanisms, and viewed copyright as an artificial, modern institution, 
Gandhi was nonetheless realistic about the fact that he wasn‟t beginning 
from a blank slate. In other words, he recognized that there were individuals 
in society who were wealthy, having made their money through the market. 
In speaking to these individuals, Gandhi went to great lengths to avoid 
alienating them completely by castigating their efforts as illegitimate and 
routinely emphasized that he wasn‟t asking them to abandon their wealth.
101
 
His project for this segment of society was instead redistributive, and in 
working to this end he readily embraced payment mechanisms. This 
extended to paying for knowledge and information, when possible. 
By 1933 Gandhi had set up three newspapers, collectively referred 
to as the Harijan, and had enlisted the help of a few commercially-oriented 
businessmen to produce vernacular editions of these newspapers so as to 
spread his message to parts of India unfamiliar with the languages that the 
original version—of Harijan—was published in.
102
 At this point, he seems 
to have been presented with the idea of making these versions available to 
the public for free, rather than for a nominal subscription amount. 
Responding to this idea, he noted: 
 
The weekly journals and leaflets are part of the necessary propaganda 
chiefly among caste Hindus. Therefore, they should pay for it. Except up 
to a point, I do not believe in presenting the public with free literature on 
any subject. It may be ever so cheap, but never free. I believe in the old 
Sanskrit proverb, “Knowledge is for those who would know.”
103
 
 
This is an important observation. His reference to caste Hindus is a 
reference to upper-caste Hindus, who in Gandhi‟s thinking were mostly 
socially and economically well-off, and therefore in no need of his support 
and charity. Free knowledge thus had its limits. Knowledge could be 
heavily subsidized, but did not have to be “free” at all times, and indeed not 
so when its recipients were both willing and able to pay for it, which the 
upper classes were. This position presents an obvious problem: what if the 
publishers (of the vernacular editions) were to price their versions beyond 
the reach of those in need of it, such as the few who communicated in these 
dialects? Once again, Gandhi seems to follow his limited acceptance of 
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prices for knowledge with a stark unwillingness to use copyright as a 
mechanism to control such behavior: 
 
[T]hese are my personal views. I can only tender my advice to the 
organizations and organizers [i.e., the presses]. There is no copyright in 
Harijan. Enterprising vernacular newspapers will publish their own 
editions of Harijan …. I can prevent no one. I can only plead with 
everyone to follow the advice which I have tendered and which based on 
considerable experience.
104
 
 
Coupled with his willingness to allow newspapers to charge 
subscribers when they are able to pay, this rejection of copyright—if 
motivated exclusively by its structure as a market-mechanism—seems 
perplexing, and out of place. Their reconciliation, lies in recognizing that to 
Gandhi, copyright was problematic then not just because of its reliance on 
the market and self-interested behavior, but because it also operated as an 
artificial restriction on the flow of knowledge and information. To be sure, 
market prices too perform the same role in several contexts.
105
 Yet, there 
appears to have been, for Gandhi, a fundamental freedom-inhibiting aspect 
to the institution of copyright that motivated his personal rejection of it. As 
a functional matter, he saw it as a duty-imposing system, one of 
“forbidding” the act of “copy[ing]” by others, which seems to have 
generated an intuitive unwillingness on his part to embrace it.
106
 
Gandhi‟s acceptance of prices for knowledge and information, while 
nonetheless rejecting copyright—has parallels in the distinction between the 
ideals of gratis and libre, that is captured by the idea “free as in free speech; 
not as in free beer,” popularized by Richard Stallman, the founder of the 
Free Software Foundation.
107
 The idea there of course being that “free” 
connotes a sense of positive liberty and the absence of restraints, rather than 
a sense of zero price. It would be too speculative to suggest that this is 
indeed what Gandhi was getting at in his observations about the Harijan, 
but at the very least, it reveals a nascent similarity to the exact same debate. 
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In summary then, this strand of Gandhi‟s thinking saw him adopting 
the baseline of rejecting copyright in his works, but as a personal matter. He 
thereby remained consciously ambivalent about others finding some virtue 
and purpose in the institution, and perhaps sought to leave open the 
possibility that he himself might at some future point find limited reason to 
endorse the institution. This latter point is evidenced in his observation that 
“[t]empting offers [to copyright his writings] have come to me no doubt in 
connection the chapters of the autobiography…and I am likely to succumb 
to the temptation for the sake of the cause I stand for.
108
” 
 
2. Strand Two: Reluctant Engagement 
 
  Around 1922, Gandhi came into contact with the well-known Rev. 
John Haynes Holmes, who had helped found the NAACP and the ACLU.
109
 
Holmes had read about Gandhi‟s activities in South Africa, and they soon 
began corresponding.
110
 Holmes at the time ran a weekly newspaper titled 
Unity, and soon sought permission from Gandhi to reproduce chapters of 
Gandhi‟s autobiography in it, as it appeared in Young India.
111
 Shortly 
thereafter, it appears that Holmes cabled Gandhi offering to try and help get 
the autobiography published in the U.S.
112
 With Gandhi‟s permission, 
Holmes began discussions with Macmillan Press in New York to bring out 
a U.S. edition of the autobiography.
113
 Gandhi at the time had few followers 
in the U.S., and Macmillan was understandably reluctant to invest in the 
project.
114
 As a precondition to their publishing the book, they thus 
demanded that Gandhi transfer to them all of his rights in the autobiography 
for both the U.S. and the U.K.
115
 
 It thus wouldn‟t have been enough for Gandhi to grant Macmillan 
permission to publish the autobiography. What Macmillan wanted was an 
outright assignment of all rights in the work. And in order to accomplish 
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this assignment, Gandhi needed to assert and claim these rights—under 
copyright law—to begin with, contrary to his established rule of not 
asserting copyright in any of his works. Holmes eventually succeeded in 
persuading Gandhi to both assert copyright in his work for the first time and 
to transfer these rights to Macmillan.
116
 Two reasons appear to have 
influenced Gandhi‟s change in position. He thus notes in a letter to Holmes: 
 
The idea of making anything out of my writings has been always 
repugnant to me. But your cable tempted me and I felt there might be no 
harm in getting money for the copyright and using it for the charkha 
propaganda or the uplift of the suppressed classes. And I felt that if the 
chapters were published by a house of known standing the message 
contained in the chapters might reach a wider public.
117
 
 
First, we see Gandhi explaining his decision in distributive terms, 
i.e., that the monetary benefits from asserting and transferring these rights 
to the publisher could be employed for his social projects involving the 
betterment of the lower classes. What is implicit, and indeed salient in this 
observation though is that accepting this distributive element entailed 
embracing the core utilitarian basis of copyright law to begin with. Unlike a 
nominal assertion of copyright that is then coupled with a functional 
abandonment of rights—an approach that Gandhi would adopt later in his 
life
118
—his approach here reflected a full acceptance of copyright‟s 
utilitarian, market-driven idea. Except of course, that he intended to employ 
this market mechanism towards a morally justifiable end. Second, it appears 
that Gandhi believed that the freedom movement (and his involvement in it) 
would stand to benefit from having its message obtain external support and 
validation from readers outside of India, the “wider public”. If this goal 
meant compromising on what was a purely personal rule, it seemed fine. 
What is interesting about this turn in Gandhi‟s thinking about 
copyright though, is his willingness to compromise. To Gandhi, “human 
life” was nothing more than a “series of compromises” and he readily 
advocated the belief that compromising on honorable terms was a perfectly 
legitimate outcome, as long as in doing so, the actor never lost sight of the 
ultimate goal or purpose.
119
 Compromising on fundamental tenets, or moral 
ideals was however completely untenable. He thus observed in an unrelated 
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context involving his struggle against an unjust law in South Africa that 
“[c]ompromise means that both the parties make large concessions on all 
points except where a principle is involved.
120
” Fundamental principles, 
ends, or essentials were thus never to be compromised on. 
Gandhi‟s actions vis-à-vis Macmillan and the publication of the 
autobiography reveals that his rejection of copyright—even in its personal 
form—wasn‟t a matter of basic principle, but was rather a somewhat 
subordinate preference that he held. Had it been otherwise, i.e., a matter of 
moral principle, it is unlikely that he would have been willing to 
compromise on it at all. The rejection of the institution to him was a largely 
pragmatic position that he had taken, which he was willing to modify when 
the broader goal would be better served by its violation. His opposition to 
copyright was thus at best situational, rather than foundational in nature. 
This isn‟t of course to suggest that Gandhi underplayed the extent 
and significance of the compromise he was undertaking. In much of his 
correspondence about the autobiography around this time, we see him 
repeatedly noting how this assertion of the copyright and “[t]he idea of 
making money out of [his] writings even for a charitable purpose [wa]s 
quite foreign to [him]
121
” and that he had “never before reserved copyright 
in any of [his] writings.
122
” His emphasis was thus on the reality that at least 
at the time, he viewed the compromise as an exception to the rule, in the 
hope of reverting to the baseline of rejection soon after.  
The episode involving the publication of his autobiography thus 
forced Gandhi to confront the precise nature of his objections to copyright. 
On doing so, he seems to have concluded that it wasn‟t a fundamental moral 
opposition, thereby allowing him to assert rights in the work and deploy the 
benefits of copyright‟s utilitarian apparatus towards his other goals: 
distributive (i.e., charitable), and nationalist (i.e., the freedom movement). 
He viewed this instance as an exception, and thus in other contexts, both 
around the same time and later, he continued to assert his baseline 
preference to rejecting copyright in his works as a personal matter.
123
 
 
3. Strand Three: Strategic Deployment 
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Gandhi‟s assertion of copyright in his autobiography and his transfer 
of publication rights to Macmillan did little to alter his adherence to his 
baseline of personally rejecting copyright even after the episode. He 
continued to avoid retaining copyright in his newspapers articles, and other 
published work for several years after. In the decade following the 
publication of the autobiography, Gandhi‟s involvement in the Indian 
freedom movement reached its peak, and saw him put several of his abstract 
ideas and principles into action, in challenging the British empire.
124
 The 
single most prominent among them was his famous Salt march to Dandi, 
wherein he marched to the beach in Dandi with his followers and made salt 
from the sea-waters in defiance of an unfair salt tax that the British had 
imposed on the domestic production of salt in India to support the 
importation of salt from Britain.
125
 In it, Gandhi was giving effect to the 
principles of civil disobedience and non-violent resistance that he had 
written about extensively before. The period between 1926 and 1940 thus 
saw Gandhi focus extensively on engaging the British empire through 
principled action and mass mobilization. The British, for their part, tried to 
fight back through a host of strategies, including by trying to discredit 
Gandhi among segments of Indian society that were wary of his 
commitments, such as the Muslim minority. In his opposition to the empire, 
Gandhi would find in copyright law, an unexpected ally. 
As the freedom movement in India became a mass movement, it 
began looking to Gandhi for guidance, approval, and planning. During 
every instance of confrontation with the empire, the movement consciously 
sought Gandhi‟s advice, and Gandhi too saw himself as speaking to the 
masses in his every action and written word. His writing during this period 
is replete with commentary on important episodes on the struggle, all of 
which ended with strategic prescriptions for future engagement.
126
 During 
this period, Gandhi used his newspaper columns and opinion pieces as the 
primary means of communicating with the freedom movement. Ensuring 
the accuracy and completeness of his message was critical, and his open 
permission to local newspapers to freely copy and translate his articles 
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without restrictions began to present problems. An episode in 1940 raised 
the salience of the issue for Gandhi. 
During an exhibition in the city of Ajmer, members of the local 
congress (the party spear-heading the freedom struggle) decided to take 
advantage of the crowd gathered, to make a few speeches, and began by 
hoisting the Indian national flag on the ramparts of an old fort, where the 
exhibition was taking place.
127
 The municipal (British-controlled) police 
issued the organizers a notice demanding that the flag be taken down right 
away, claiming that it offended “certain sections of the public,” since the 
fort where the flag was being flown was a monument to a Moghul (i.e., 
Muslim) ruler.
128
 At the time, the nationalist freedom movement was 
viewed with deep suspicion by India‟s Muslim minority, a suspicion that 
eventually resulted in the partition of India into two countries.
129
 The 
British strategy was to play into this suspicion, and use it as a pretext on 
which to suppress the activities of the freedom struggle—as fomenting 
violence. As soon as the organizers of the meeting and the exhibition 
received the police commissioner‟s message—that the flag had to be 
lowered—they contacted Gandhi on the telephone for his advice.
130
 Instead 
of asking his followers to resist the police order, Gandhi asked them to 
comply with it, worrying that if the allegations were indeed true, it might 
spark avoidable sectarian violence.
131
 
In a series of newspaper articles, Gandhi meticulously described the 
episode: first in palpably neutral terms,
132
 then as seen by the police 
commissioner (by reproducing the commissioner‟s report),
133
 and finally in 
his own terms, refuting the police commissioner‟s findings and insinuations 
about the possibility of violence, which Gandhi had after investigating the 
matter on his own, characterized as false.
134
  A few newspapers that were 
opposed to the nationalist movement (and perhaps controlled by the British) 
chose to selectively reproduce Gandhi‟s writings on the episode. They 
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translated and reproduced Gandhi‟s objective account, and the 
commissioner‟s reply, but refused to reproduce Gandhi‟s final refutation of 
the commissioner‟s account—thereby implying that Gandhi agreed with the 
commissioner‟s position.
135
 This troubled several of Gandhi‟s followers. 
They argued that if Gandhi had indeed asserted copyright in his works, he 
could have prevented these “Anglo-Indian papers” from selectively 
reproducing his writing on the incident, thereby ensuring against the 
communication of the “untruth” or of “half-truths”.
136
 
Connecting copyright to the idea of truth or to put the point more 
precisely, connecting the act of copying to the idea of falsehood or untruth, 
was an important move in the effort to get Gandhi to see the value in 
copyright. Gandhi‟s adherence to the truth as his guiding normative ideal 
was legendary,
137
 and few things were likely to move him more than the 
belief that his failure to assert copyright was somehow resulting in the truth 
being compromised. By accusing him of being “a party to the spread of 
untruth
138
” indirectly, his supporters believed he could be swayed into 
exercising his copyright. Gandhi at first seems to have seen right through 
this strategy, and refused to alter his default position, observing: 
 
The Ajmer illustration quoted by my correspondent is clinching. This 
matter of copyright has been often brought before me. But I have not the 
heart to copyright my articles….I must believe that in the end my self-
denial must serve the cause of truth.
139
 
 
Yet, a few weeks later, Gandhi reversed his decision openly. 
Acknowledging the reversal, and its reasons, he observed: 
 
It is strange that what I would not do in response to the advice of a 
correspondent I have to do almost immediately after the refusal though, I 
feel, for a very cogent reason. Since my main articles will henceforth be 
written in Gujarati, I would not like their unauthorized translations 
appearing in the Press. I have suffered much from mistranslations when I 
used to write profusely in Gujarati and had no time myself to produce 
simultaneous English translation. I have arranged this time for such 
translation in English and Hindustani. I would therefore ask editors and 
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publishers kindly to regard English and Hindustani translation rights as 
reserved. I have no doubt that my request will be respected.
140
 
 
While objectively speaking, Gandhi‟s observations do indicate a 
reversal in position in so far as they exhibit a willingness to accept the 
utility of copyright, it is nonetheless important to note Gandhi‟s injection of 
important nuances while doing so. First, the concern that he suggests 
motivated the reversal is different from that put forth by his supporters. The 
incomplete communication of Gandhi‟s views around the Ajmer episode 
was hardly an instance of “mistranslation”. It was instead an instance of 
selective reproduction—something that Gandhi‟s selective reservation of 
translation rights was unlikely to guard against. Second, in contrast to the 
position advocated by his supporters, Gandhi wasn‟t asserting a full 
copyright in his newspaper articles. He was instead merely reserving the 
translation rights in the work, and specifically in relation to the two 
languages most commonly employed by the nationalist movement: English 
and Hindi.
141
 This point is analytically very interesting, since it suggests 
that Gandhi viewed copyright as a fundamentally divisible bundle of 
rights,
142
 and was willing to divide the bundle in ensuring that he retained 
only as much as was necessary for his specific concern (i.e., mistranslation) 
to be allayed. British copyright law, which was extended to India, granted 
authors a set of exclusive rights, with the translation right being one that 
was specifically enumerated.
143
 Identifying the translation right and treating 
it as an independent right was something that only someone familiar with 
the law was likely to have come up with—especially since it wasn‟t at all 
suggested by any of Gandhi‟s supporters.  
Third, the normative source of Gandhi‟s reservation of rights seems 
consciously ambivalent in his statement. Instead of hinting at the possibility 
of an infringement action or an analogous invocation of copyright‟s formal 
legal structure to enforce his reservation of rights, Gandhi is content to 
observe that his mere public assertion of these rights is likely to result in his 
wishes being respected. Once again, the approach he adopts is very 
personal. In appealing to the unique normative force his own statements and 
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requests had on the Indian public, Gandhi was interlacing the formal legal 
structure of the institution involved, i.e., copyright, with an informal 
normativity that was unique to him and his position in the Indian national 
movement. And in so doing, Gandhi avoided having to interact with the 
political and legal machinery of the British, which he was resisting in 
numerous other contexts.
144
 
We see Gandhi willing to accept copyright for a limited purpose in 
this passage. What distinguishes his approach here from the one involving 
his autobiography is that here, his assertion of copyright isn‟t work-specific, 
and functions as a prospective change in approach. It thus wasn‟t just a 
contextual violation (or non-application) of the rule of personal rejection as 
it was in relation to the autobiography, but was instead a modification of the 
rule itself. Henceforth, Gandhi came to be seen as asserting a limited 
copyright—i.e., the translation right—in his Gujarati writing, modifying his 
baseline of personally rejecting copyright in its entirety. 
Gandhi‟s change in position didn‟t go unnoticed by newspapers. 
Newspapers that published articles in English and Hindi worried that their 
inability to communicate Gandhi‟s message to their local readers would 
reduce their readership dramatically. One of them even wrote to Gandhi 
protesting his change in position, and arguing that his articles were “the 
property of the nation and therefore there could be no copyright in them”.
145
 
Gandhi was thus forced to provide a more elaborate explanation for his 
reversal. Gandhi‟s response was telling: 
 
This grievance appears on the face of it to be just. But it is forgotten that I 
have prohibited translation from Gujarati into all other languages. 
Experience had taught me that English translations of my articles written 
in any Indian languages were faulty, but it would not have been proper to 
confine the copyright to translations into English. All important Gujarati 
articles would be translated simultaneously into English and Hindustani 
and published almost at the same time. There is, therefore, no hardship 
involved, for there is no copyright in the translated articles which can be 
and are being reproduced.
146
 
 
 In this instance, Gandhi‟s explanation appears to involve a 
clarification, an incremental modification of the original position, and an 
attempted compromise to placate the grievance, which he saw as legitimate. 
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He clearly reiterates his reasons for the shift in position—alluding to the 
mistranslation of his views by certain newspapers—and appears steadfast in 
his basis for the shift in position. All the same, he seems to recognize that if 
his reservation of translation rights was only for English and Hindi 
translations, it would detrimentally affect newspapers published in these 
languages, while enabling those publishing in other Indian languages to 
compete on an unequal basis, and perhaps commit some of the mistakes he 
was seeking to restrict through his very reservation of rights. He thus 
reinterprets his prior reservation as extending to translations “into all other 
languages.
147
” 
 Gandhi was thus acutely aware of the harm that his reservation of 
rights was likely to cause among newspapers. Nowhere does he answer the 
obvious question: why would it not have been “proper” to confine the 
copyright to translations into English alone? The answer seems to lie—
judging from the overall tone and tenor of the response—in the unequal 
economic hardship this would cause English language newspapers alone. 
The principle of unfair competition thus seems to have implicitly informed 
Gandhi‟s thinking here, and forced the modification in position.
148
 
 The final, and perhaps most nuanced move that Gandhi‟s response 
makes here is in its treatment of the translation right as a right involving an 
action rather than an artifact. We noted how Gandhi in asserting copyright 
in his Gujarati articles was clear in reserving no more than the rights to 
translate those works into other languages.
149
 In the ordinary understanding, 
a copyright owner is given (and asserts) the translation right in order to 
produce a translation of the original work, and thereupon obtains (either 
automatically or through minimal effort) the same set of exclusive rights in 
the translation as well.
150
 The exclusive right to create a translation that 
copyright grants authors of literary works is thus in teleological terms tied 
to the exclusive rights to (or in) the translation that the author seeks. Gandhi 
very consciously disentangled the two. All that he wanted to reserve to 
himself was the exclusive right to produce the first translation of his articles 
from Gujarati to other language. Once translated, he fell back on his 
baseline of rejecting copyright in the translated version, and allowed others 
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to copy it freely.
151
 Once again then, we see a masterful lawyerly 
unbundling of copyright‟s structure coupled with a narrow tailoring of the 
reservation to the problem that he sought to solve. 
 Once Gandhi encountered the problem with mistranslations and 
asserted a translation right as part of copyright, it appears to have influenced 
his broader approach to copyright in his other work as well. Recall that 
early on when he was producing the individual chapters of his 
autobiography and publishing them in newspapers, he openly granted 
permission to newspapers and other publishers to translate these chapters 
into other languages, and reproduce them even when done for commercial 
purposes.
152
 Yet, after he reserved the translation right in his Gujarati 
articles, he appears to have begun adopting the same approach in relation to 
requests to translate his autobiography into other Indian languages. Since he 
had been forced to assert copyright in the autobiography by Macmillan, and 
had ended up transferring to them the rights for the U.S. and the U.K., he 
still held the copyright in the book for other territories and languages. 
Instead of declaring that others were allowed to translate and reproduce his 
autobiography in local languages, we see him beginning to play somewhat 
of a gatekeeper role, just as he had for his Gujarati articles—all to prevent 
mistranslations. 
 Gandhi was, in the later part of his life, approached by numerous 
publishers who sought to translate his autobiography into vernacular 
languages, and this presented Gandhi with the question of going about 
choosing between different translators and publishers. In relation to his 
Gujarati newspaper articles, he had circumvented this problem by agreeing 
to translate the articles into English and Hindi himself.
153
 Some of his 
followers had suggested setting up regional (or vernacular) boards to review 
different translations for authenticity before granting permission. Gandhi 
however saw an obvious problem with this.
154
 Setting up different boards 
and reviewing translations obviously meant a great investment of time and 
effort. Additionally though, it meant signing off on the translation and 
approving it. This latter approach seemed problematic to Gandhi, for while 
he wanted to avoid mistranslations, he was nonetheless fully aware that 
                                                          
151 Gandhi, “Copyright”, supra note __, at 409. 
152 Gandhi, Two Just Complaints, supra note __, at 36. 
153 Id. 
154 See Mohandas K. Gandhi, Letter to Jivanji D. Desai, in 88 CWMG, supra note __, at 421 
(“Anand Hingorani had suggested different Boards, so that the Tamil Board would device about the 
Tamil translation and the Malayalam Board would advise about the translation in that language.”) 
(hereinafter Gandhi, Letter to Desai-I). 
              GANDHI AND COPYRIGHT PRAGMATISM                           
 
 
38 
translating a work was itself an expressive act.
155
 Giving him (or his board) 
control over this process seems to have raised for Gandhi the specter of 
censorship, which he was troubled by. Speaking of multiple translations and 
his approach to exercising his copyright, he thus observed: 
 
There are several translations of Tolstoy‟s books in the same language. All 
of them are not up to the mark, and the titles of the books also have been 
translated differently. All of them sell, but the translation which is most 
faithful to the original, most painstaking and beautiful sells more than the 
other translations. The same has happened in the case of the Bible. The 
authorized version is there but there are many others in the field and their 
publication is not prohibited. Every translation has its own circle of 
readers.
156
 
 
 Here we see him drawing on the experiences of Leo Tolstoy, with 
whom he had struck up a friendship through correspondence.
157
 The 
principal idea here is that multiple translations can co-exist, even when they 
diverge from the original. Gandhi believed that readers—in the marketplace 
of ideas—would gravitate towards the translation that exhibited the greatest 
fidelity to the original version; but nonetheless saw virtue in allowing 
multiple versions to co-exist. He thus concluded against asserting a 
gatekeeper role in approving translations: 
 
How should we know which of the two is really good? Or would it be 
advisable to stop other translations from being published? I do not see 
much benefit in that. Even when we decided to claim copyright, I did not 
go as far as that. This matter cannot be looked at from a purely legal point 
of view, nor from a purely financial one. We should look at it wholly from 
a moral and practical point of view.
158
 
 
His “moral” and “practical” beliefs—in contrast to his “legal” and 
“financial” ones—led him to allow multiple translations of the 
autobiography without any restrictions. On the face of things, this position 
appears to render his whole assertion of translation rights in the 
autobiography moot and meaningless. If he wasn‟t going to play a 
gatekeeper role in any way or form, why retain the translation right at all? 
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Gandhi doesn‟t seem to answer that question here. In a follow up letter 
though, he explicates further to reveal why he had indeed reserved these 
rights and what he was hoping to do with it: 
 
I have seen in English more translations than one of a good book. I don‟t 
find anything wrong in it. Our only aim in retaining the copyright can be to 
guard against possible misuse of the privilege. But if we have authorized 
one person, and then another public-spirited person who can do a better 
translation comes forward, why should we not give him the permission. 
This is my line of reasoning.
159
 
 
The references to misuse of the privilege and public-spirited, which operate 
as important qualifiers are somewhat cryptic here. Gandhi‟s true intent 
behind them however becomes apparent a few sentences later, when in the 
same letter he observes: 
 
I have decided for the present to refuse permission for a Finnish 
translation, for the person‟s intention seems to be to make profit.
160  
 
The misuse of the privilege that Gandhi was referring to was thus an 
attempt to profit from the translation, rather than spread its message. And 
indeed it was precisely in order to police a publisher‟s intention that he sees 
the virtue in retaining control over the translation rights to his 
autobiography. A profit-based motivation is to be contrasted, in this 
construction, with a public-spirited publisher. 
What is fascinating in this exchange is less Gandhi‟s binary 
dichotomy and indeed its questionable workability, but rather the structural 
approach that Gandhi‟s embrace of copyright entails. In it, we see his 
steadfast denouncement of utilitarian, market-based behavior, coupled with 
a willingness to employ a market-based institution strategically, i.e., 
copyright, to subvert its core normative values. Copyright was thus being 
used not to further the profit motives of distributors, but to reject them. In 
the traditional understanding, an author negotiates with a 
publisher/distributor who is willing to publish the book in return for a share 
of the proceeds from sales of the book. The profit motivation brings the 
publisher to the author, and the parties‟ willingness to enter into an 
arrangement is dictated almost entirely by the monetary benefits each side is 
to obtain from it. Gandhi‟s approach had the logic the other way around. A 
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publisher was to approach him for permission to translate the work into 
another language, and the basis of the bargain was the publisher‟s ability to 
convince Gandhi that it wasn‟t committed to profit-maximization, but was 
instead equally (or perhaps more) interested in disseminating Gandhi‟s 
message as widely as possible. Copyright was thus being asserted not to 
allow for self-interested behavior, but instead to purge such self-interested 
actors from dealing with his autobiography (the “misuse of the privilege”), 
and to encourage public-spirited behavior in its place.
161
 It is of course 
unclear whether Gandhi had intended all along that his assertion of the 
translation right—i.e., of copyright—would be employed to this end, or 
whether this is something that he gravitated towards as he saw the concern 
with censorship diminish his potential role in approving the content of 
translations. 
Gandhi‟s encounters with translations of his work in the last decade 
of his life thus saw him move from reluctantly embracing copyright as he 
had with Macmillan to a strategic use of its framework to further his role in 
the freedom struggle, and later to give effect to his commitment to non-
utilitarian, and other-regarding behavior. Interestingly enough though, even 
when accepting copyright and deploying it strategically towards these 
limited ends, his engagement with it assumed a nuance and lawyerly 
attention to the details of the institution and its functioning, that are 
somewhat orthogonal to his abstract thinking in other areas, where he spoke 
in terms of generalities. Even when he saw the virtues of deploying 
copyright strategically and in a limited fashion, he always exhibited an 
acute awareness of the institution‟s costs, and sought to control for them 
through practical mechanisms. Whether these controls were successful or 
not is of course another issue. 
 
B. Synthesizing the Strands 
 
 Putting the three dimensions of Gandhi‟s views on copyright law 
together does in fact produce a coherent and rational picture of his 
engagement with copyright. While Part III develops the theoretical side of 
this account—as representing a form of copyright pragmatism—more 
fully,
162
 this Section attempts to provide a brief explanatory synthesis of 
Gandhi‟s thinking on copyright law. 
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 The first enduring feature of Gandhi‟s interaction with copyright law 
is no doubt his personal skepticism of the institution and its applicability to 
him and his writings. While he wasn‟t opposed to the institution as a whole, 
and indeed readily conceded its limited desirability even in the abstract, he 
seems to have operated all along under the steadfast believe that copyright‟s 
fundamental reliance on artificial scarcity, market-based distribution, and 
profit-driven approach to inducing expressive activity, were misaligned 
with the ways in which he wrote, published, and expected to have his 
writings reach the broader public. Much of this no doubt originated in his 
abstract thinking, wherein he opposed utilitarianism, self-interested 
behavior, and market-driven models;
163
 yet it also likely drew in large part 
from the role that the act of “writing” performed in his mind. Writing, to 
Gandhi was largely an act of practical reasoning, and he thus seems to have 
adopted the view that copyright and its incentive structure were irrelevant to 
the latter, and thus by implication to the former as well.
164
 
 While Gandhi‟s skepticism of copyright was in one sense 
“principled,” it at the same time wasn‟t a skepticism that emanated from a 
belief that was fundamental enough to be beyond the realm of compromise. 
His rejection of copyright was thus a preference. This is important, because 
it allowed Gandhi to modify this preference circumstantially, and over time, 
whenever needed.  
During the course of his engagement with copyright, Gandhi 
modified his baseline of personal rejection on two occasions, both in 
significantly different ways. The first was in relation to Macmillan‟s 
insistence that he assert his rights in order to give them the publication 
rights for the U.S. and U.K.
165
 It appears as though Gandhi wasn‟t fully 
prepared for this eventuality, which is reflected in his continuing complaints 
about the change in position and in his failure to come up with a strategic 
compromise. This first engagement was thus in large measure involuntary. 
Gandhi‟s voluntary modification of his personal baseline occurred 
during the height of the freedom struggle, when he worried that the 
integrity, authenticity, and completeness of his published messages were 
being compromised through copying. Here as we saw, he unbundled 
copyright‟s rights to assert no more than a limited first translation right, and 
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even then sought to alleviate the effects of this assertion by producing 
translations expeditiously and thereafter renouncing all rights in the 
translations, once produced. It is during this modification that we see 
Gandhi fully explicating his concerns with copyright. 
Perhaps the most astute modification that Gandhi made in his 
position on copyright was in his willingness to differentiate the legal 
institution from its underlying normative values. In the later part of his 
engagement with copyright, once he came to assert limited rights in his 
works, he began to see that his retention of rights could indeed be used to 
further the precise reasons why he had initially distanced himself from it. 
This was perhaps the most important modification in position that Gandhi 
made in his dealings with the institution, and speaks of a willingness to 
adopt a highly granular (indeed one might say, lawyerly) disaggregation of 
copyright law, its justifications, and its consequences. In this nuanced 
engagement, we see Gandhi juxtaposing copyright‟s basic framework of 
exclusivity against the ideas of freedom, free expression, access to 
information, unfair competition and censorship broadly understood. At each 
stage of engagement, he sought to trade his assertion of copyright off 
against the institution‟s negative effects, and alleviate them through 
practical solutions. His limited assertion of copyright was thus at each 
juncture accompanied by a set of additional principles and mechanisms 
wherein he sought to lower the costs that he saw the institution imposing on 
other socially beneficial activities. 
From a theoretical point of view, Gandhi‟s shift in position on 
copyright occurred as he saw that it embodied a commitment to attribution 
and integrity within its overall utilitarian skein. His reservation of the first 
translation right after the Ajmer episode appears to mark the beginning of 
this realization. Most modern legal systems today treat these values as the 
substance of inalienable “moral rights,
166
” that are contrasted with 
copyright‟s other freely transferable economic rights. Yet at the time, 
neither Indian nor U.K. copyright law recognized the idea of moral rights, 
and focused entirely on its economic dimension.
167
 Recognizing his 
inability to protect these values independent of the institution, Gandhi 
nonetheless invoked copyright‟s economic framework, but for moral rights-
like purposes. Scholars have long noted how copyright‟s largely utilitarian, 
economic framework may be strategically used to serve the purposes of 
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moral rights, i.e., attribution and integrity, even when the system doesn‟t 
recognize moral rights independently.
168
 Gandhi‟s change in position serves 
as a prime example of precisely how this occurs and may be put into action, 
through a conscious unbundling and selective reservation of copyright‟s 
rights-framework. 
There was in addition however, an important respect in which 
Gandhi‟s invocation of copyright‟s framework wasn‟t merely directed at 
replicating the working of moral rights, something that his final position 
came to reflect. This was the reality that copyright‟s basic framework (of 
exclusivity) could be deployed towards a wider range of non-economic ends 
beyond just attribution and integrity, extending to the negation of economic 
motives. Copyright‟s gatekeeper role, traditionally conceived of as a 
mechanism of revenue generation, was to Gandhi a mechanism for policing 
the motives of individuals who sought to copy or translate his work, and in 
the process ensure that those motivated by the goals that he considered 
illegitimate were excluded.  
To summarize then, Gandhi‟s engagement with copyright reflected 
three characteristics: a skepticism, a non-foundational rejection, and a 
technical disaggregation of the institution and its different moving parts. 
Table 1 below summarizes Gandhi‟s evolution in thinking, represented in 
these three strands. 
 
Table 1: The Evolution of Gandhi’s Views on Copyright Law 
 
 Rough Time 
Period 
Central Features Rights Asserted 
 
Personal Rejection 
1909-26 & 1928-40  Personal preference 
to avoid 
 Recognition of some 
value in the 
institution 
 Allowance for future 
modification in 
position 
None 
 
Reluctant 
Acceptance 
1926-28  Seen as a one-time 
compromise 
 Justified in 
distributive terms 
All rights in the one 
work: i.e., the 
autobiography 
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Strategic 
Deployment 
1940-48  Reservation of first 
translation right. 
 Abandonment of 
rights in actual 
translation 
 Use of rights to 
prevent further 
commercialization 
First translation right 
(in newspaper 
articles) 
 
Extended to 
translation rights in 
autobiography 
 
 
III. GANDHI AS A COPYRIGHT PRAGMATIST 
 
 Gandhi‟s actual views on copyright law are thus to be contrasted 
with much of his abstract philosophy, and what it might have predicted his 
position would be on copyright, a fundamentally market-based economic 
institution. This Part argues that Gandhi‟s approach to copyright law 
represents a distinctive form of engagement and interaction with the 
institution—copyright pragmatism—that entails recognizing copyright‟s 
nature as a legal institution, engaging it critically, and utilizing it 
contextually to realize a set of shifting normative goals and ideals that 
aren‟t all central to the institution and its functioning. Drawing on 
philosophical and legal pragmatism, forms of reasoning that insist on 
contextualized decision-making that pays close attention to both short- and 
long-term consequences, copyright pragmatism represents an important 
middle ground in the debates between copyright minimalists and 
expansionists. Discussions of copyright reform would do well to 
incorporate several of its important insights, many of which Gandhi seems 
to have recognized and incorporated into his own thinking decades ago. 
 This Part begins by examining the basic tenets of philosophical and 
legal pragmatism and describing their plausible connection to Gandhi‟s own 
approach to practical reasoning, which he self-characterized as “practical 
idealism.” (III.A.) Using Gandhi‟s own views on copyright as a lens, it then 
moves to setting out what copyright pragmatism entails, its basic tenets, and 
what they involve during interactions with, or decision-making within, the 
copyright system. (III.B.)  
 
A. Gandhi‟s Pragmatic Philosophy of Action 
 
As we saw in Part I, Gandhi‟s writings no doubt reveal a set of 
abstract economic ideas and principles, which many today characterize as a 
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form of “Gandhian economics”.
169
 Yet, the fact of the matter remains that if 
seen as abstract principles, their influence on Gandhi‟s own actions remains 
largely inconsistent. His rejection of utilitarianism in the abstract thus seems 
to sit at odds with his embrace of copyright, however limited. The problem 
was hardly that Gandhi was a hypocrite who failed to practice what he 
preached. It was rather that Gandhi believed that his actions, and his 
reasoning behind them were far more representative of his views, than were 
his statements when de-contextualized and taken as abstract propositions. 
He is thus known to have famously noted: “My life is my message,
170
” 
seemingly suggesting that if individuals were to seek guidance from him, 
they should look to his actions rather than his statements. Gandhi‟s theory 
of action—what one may call his philosophy of action—provide a powerful 
and plausible explanation for his interaction with copyright law, and its 
various facets. It is this theory of action that this Section unbundles; it ought 
to therefore be seen as distinct and self-consciously superior to (though not 
inconsistent with) the abstract economic ideas that scholars draw from 
Gandhi‟s writing, in accounting for Gandhi‟s own actions. This Section 
argues that Gandhi‟s theory of action was at base a form of philosophical 
pragmatism. 
Pragmatism is today thought of as a school of philosophical thinking 
that is uniquely American in origin and approach.
171
 Attributed to the 
writings of Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and later Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., pragmatism has in the last decade or so, seen a revival 
both as an approach to philosophy and as a method of legal reasoning and 
analysis.
172
 Gandhi‟s own thinking—as a philosophy of action—reveals 
extremely close parallels to pragmatism, as developed in the U.S., a 
connection that has found surprisingly little discussion in the literature.
173
 
This Section attempts to unpack the functional similarity between 
pragmatism and Gandhi‟s own approach, which he styled “practical 
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idealism” and then shows how this connection carries over to the realm of 
legal reasoning, seen in Gandhi‟s engagement with copyright law. 
 
1. Gandhi‟s Practical Idealism as a Form of Philosophical 
Pragmatism 
 
Much of the theoretical and philosophical literature on Gandhi tends 
to characterize him as a moral idealist, which sees him as an absolutist who 
adopted a moral critic of politics.
174
 A recent turn in the political theory 
literature has begun to cast doubt on this characterization, arguing that 
Gandhi‟s core beliefs—seen in his commitment to non-violence and truth—
represent not just moral propositions, but a particular “practical orientation” 
towards politics which entailed a “contextual, consequentialist, and moral-
psychological analysis” of the political world around him.
175
 
Gandhi characterized his own approach to politics and thinking as 
that of a “practical idealist”.
176
 This seemingly oxymoronic phrase captures 
what was an essential tenet to his philosophy, namely, its means-orientation. 
Central to Gandhi was his emphasis on the means employed towards 
realizing any goal (the end), and he routinely observed that “means are after 
all everything.
177
” In contrast to plain (or moral) idealism, that emphasizes 
ends rather than means in its pursuit of absolute moral ideals, and thereby 
degenerates into a form of blatant instrumentalism, Gandhi focused on 
means, not to the exclusion of ends, but instead as intricately connected to 
the ends in question.
178
 To him, means and ends were in a sense reflexive 
(or “convertible”) concepts, with the former capable of embodying (or even 
creating) the latter.
179
 This in turn meant a strong focus on practical action 
over simple theorization and abstraction.
180
 Gandhi‟s political philosophy 
was thus in essence a philosophy of action. 
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At the same time though, Gandhi‟s approach embodied an important 
strategic dimension, which is perhaps responsible for its interpretation as a 
form of moral absolutism. In seeking to gain wide social acceptance for his 
ideas, Gandhi realized that he needed to articulate them using the ideas and 
concepts that were socially acceptable at the time.
181
 As one scholar thus 
notes, he therefore consciously chose to give his ideas a “transcendental 
look” that in turn provided them with a facial rigidity and absolutism.
182
 
Yet, when one probes deeper into his thinking, one sees that he used these 
seemingly transcendental ideas and concepts rather loosely and 
contextually, which renders them palpably non-absolutist and non-
transcendental in practice. 
Gandhi‟s well-known commitment to “truth” formed the core 
organizing idea of his actions. Gandhi routinely described his conception of 
truth in overtly absolutist terms, often referring to it as his God, and as 
representing something unattainable.
183
 At the same time though, he refused 
to define it with any sense of precision.
184
 While at once characterizing truth 
as the “sovereign principle” and noting that it entailed “not only truthfulness 
in word, but truthfulness in thought also, and not only the relative truth of 
our conception, but the Absolute Truth,” he also accepted the reality that 
this absolute truth was in some sense unattainable and that as a consequence 
individuals needed to be guided by their own conceptions of the “relative 
truth”.
185
 Truth was thus to Gandhi multi-faceted, and to be realized by each 
individual on his or her own. It thus of necessity entailed an element of 
fallibility. What this translated into in practice though, was the conversion 
of truth into a necessarily contingent ideal, whose content was determined 
contextually and indeed susceptible of modification over time. Truth thus 
had an evolutionary dimension to it, beyond being relativistic. To the 
untrained reader who takes Gandhi‟s conception of truth to be a simple 
absolutist one, this evolution might certainly come across as contradictory 
or inconsistent. Yet, to Gandhi, it was a seemingly perfectionist ideal, 
constitutively incomplete, and directly motivational. He thus observed, 
rather poignantly at one point:
186
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I would like to say to the diligent reader of my writings and to others who 
are interested in them that I am not at all concerned with appearing to be 
consistent. In my search after Truth I have discarded many ideas and learnt 
many new things. Old as I am in age, I have no feeling that I have ceased 
to grow inwardly or that my growth will stop at the dissolution of the 
flesh. What I am concerned with is my readiness to obey the call of Truth, 
my God, from moment to moment, and therefore, when anybody finds any 
inconsistency between any two writings of mine, if he has still faith in my 
sanity, he would do well to choose the later of the two on the same subject. 
 
 This is a startlingly honest and self-reflective observation. Truth is 
explicitly rendered relational and contextual, and partakes of a teleological 
character. It also entails a strong commitment to an evolutionary 
incommensurability that allows an actor to view his or her past decisions 
with a sense of sympathy and detachment, a character-trait that is 
commonly described as “practical wisdom”.
187
 Additionally, and perhaps 
most importantly, is treats truth as an experiential—rather than abstract, or 
theoretical—goal. This is in some ways precisely how Gandhi used what 
appeared to be morally absolute concepts, in the development of his 
uniquely practical philosophy of action.
188
 
 The experiential and contextual nature of truth also highlights 
another important dimension to Gandhi‟s thinking, and indeed one that 
pervaded the thinking of the early American pragmatist philosophers. This 
was the idea of “experimentation.
189
” Life and existence itself, were to 
Gandhi, mere “experiments in the practice of truth and non-violence.
190
” 
What Gandhi seems to be implying here is that truth to an individual can 
only be realized through observing outcomes and consequences involving 
principled action. Experiments were, to be sure, never credited with any 
finality, but they allowed one to reflect on the nature and situational 
embodiment of truth.
191
 In this, we see a strong parallel to John Dewey‟s 
theory of experimentalism, and the idea as one scholar notes that 
“[k]nowledge arises only when the validity of reflective considerations is 
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determined by trying them in action
192
.” Experimenting with the truth in 
order to realize it was thus to Gandhi, his life‟s very existential mission, 
which explains the unique title he chose for this autobiography.
193
 
 The originality of Gandhi‟s philosophy of action thus lies in its 
creative (and conscious) conflation of means and ends, its subtle subversion 
of absolutist concepts by infusing them with contingent and experiential 
content, and its recognition of the infallibility of the human endeavor for 
truth, which in turn allows for a situational modification and revision of 
one‟s judgments and ideas. This last point allowed Gandhi‟s thinking to 
remain normatively pluralist, a reality that assumes significance for its 
extension to the realm of legal analysis, as we shall soon see.
194
  
 Around the same time that Gandhi was developing his thinking 
within the context of the Indian independence movement, a school of 
thought was beginning to emerge in the U.S., that shared several of his core 
beliefs and ideas. “Pragmatism,” as it came to be called, emerged in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, principally in the works of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.
195
 To the movement, as 
originally conceived, the central question was about reconciling scientific, 
empirically-driven thinking with beliefs and ideas that were motivated by 
morality and other a priori principles.
196
 Pragmatism thus emerged as a 
mediating philosophy, and its central tenet—described by some as the 
“pragmatist maxim”—was to resolve the question and other similar 
questions of incommensurability, by looking principally at the practical 
consequences of each position.
197
 This in turn meant specifying the conflict 
further contextually, and choosing among alternative practical outcomes 
once the context and its implications become clear. James thus described it 
as entailing an empiricist‟s outlook, for its emphasis on actual consequences 
over abstract dogmas or principles.
198
 
 Given its strong emphasis on practical consequences, pragmatism 
also came to develop a particularly nuanced conception of truth. Indeed, to 
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William James pragmatism was itself a theory about truth.
199
 Since 
empirical verification was motivational to pragmatism, truth assumed a 
contingent character. James thus famously observed that ideas “become true 
in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of 
our experience.
200
” In other words, truth was an experiential quality, and for 
a belief or process to be true, it thus had to conform to other verifiable 
sensible experiences for the individual advocating its truth.
201
 To be sure, 
each of the founding pragmatist philosophers had different views on truth. 
Yet, the idea that is common to all of them is the recognition that truth is 
not an objectively ascertainable absolute—it is experiential, contingent, and 
therefore relative. 
 Despite its emphasis on consequences, it is important to note that 
pragmatism isn‟t just another version of utilitarianism. Neither is it a purely 
consequentialist approach either, understood as approaches that evaluate an 
action exclusively by reference to their ends, abstractly construed.
202
 
Pragmatism instead looks to consequences of different kinds but isn‟t bound 
to a particular normative conception of consequences such as utilitarianism. 
It thereby allows the very idea of consequences to derive content from 
empirical reality and experience, rather than an absolute normative or 
ethical vision. In this sense then, pragmatism is commonly seen as meta-
ethically pluralist in outlook and approach.
203
 
 As a philosophy of action, pragmatism also came to emphasize the 
importance of experimentation in inquiry. The central idea in pragmatism, 
as noted earlier, was to understand how beliefs and ideas could be subjected 
to empirical validation in decision-making, and to this end, pragmatists 
developed complex approaches of “inquiry” to subject various abstract 
hypotheses to scrutiny in the real-world.
204
 Experimentation through such 
inquiry was thus critical to pragmatism. John Dewey, in fact went so far as 
to characterize his version of pragmatism as “experimentalism,” 
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emphasizing its application of the scientific outlook of inquiry to what are 
ordinarily thought of as theoretical or abstract beliefs.
205
 
 Pragmatists also routinely exhibited an underappreciated nuance in 
their discussion of means and ends, which as we noted was a highlight of 
Gandhi‟s practical idealism. Dewey for instance, developed a theory of 
“reciprocal determination” of means and ends under which the very “value 
of the end depends on the costs and benefits of the means.
206
” Unlike 
standard instrumentalism that takes an end as a static and looks exclusively 
to the means needed to arrive at the end, Dewey‟s pragmatism seems to 
emphasize a reflexive relationship between ends and means, wherein the 
means provide an avenue for assessing the legitimacy and value of the ends 
in question, forcing the end to be modified or amended when needed.
207
 In 
so doing, at least as a practical matter, it allows means to determine the 
content of the ends in question. 
 Gandhi‟s version of practical idealism thus reveals several important 
similarities to pragmatism as a broad philosophical movement. There 
appears to be little evidence of his having come into contact with the work 
of the pragmatists, or vice-versa, which makes the strong (and 
contemporaneous) parallelism between the two philosophies very 
intriguing.
208
 This is hardly to suggest that Gandhi‟s practical idealism was 
just another version of pragmatism. To the contrary, it remained fairly 
distinct, rooted as it was in the needs and circumstances of the India at the 
time. Yet, its core structure and ideals remained distinctively pragmatic in 
orientation, as the term has come to be understood in philosophy. Its use of 
truth as a contingent ideal, its emphasis on practical and experiential 
reasoning, its conscious means-orientation and conflation of means and 
ends, its rejection of utilitarianism while retaining a consequence-sensitive 
orientation, its reliance on experimentation to test the value and truth of 
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ideas, and most importantly its emphasis on action, all lend support to the 
idea that Gandhi‟s “practical idealism” was at base a means-focused form of 
pragmatic thinking.  
This parallelism is however more than just intellectually interesting. 
Philosophical pragmatism, both at the time of its development, and more 
recently, has come to be translated into a somewhat unique approach to 
legal reasoning and analysis—referred to today as legal pragmatism.
209
 
Indeed, there is some evidence that Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatic 
philosophy was heavily influenced by a lawyer-friend;
210
 and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. was good friends with both Peirce and William James, 
and influenced their thinking.
211
 If we accept Gandhi‟s practical idealism as 
having clear pragmatic (in the philosophical sense) overtones, we should 
thus expect his engagement with the law and legal institutions (such as 
copyright) to exhibit features of legal pragmatism. And not surprisingly it 
indeed does. 
 
2. Gandhi‟s Copyright Engagements as a Form of Legal 
Pragmatism 
 
As a philosophy of action, the basic ideas of pragmatism found their 
way into the analysis of law and legal rules rather easily. When and how 
this occurred is a question that is open to some debate. Tom Grey thus 
argues that legal pragmatism—the application of pragmatic ideals to legal 
analysis—developed on its own, and is normatively justifiable as a 
“freestanding” form of legal analysis, i.e., independent of philosophical 
pragmatism, which had a discrete set of goals that were constructed within 
the specific context of narrow philosophical debates.
212
 Others however 
take a more ambivalent position. Richard Posner for instance, concedes the 
normative independence of legal pragmatism as a freestanding approach, 
yet emphasizes that philosophical and legal pragmatism did indeed “co-
evolve” at the same time, and perhaps more importantly, among the same 
set of individuals.
213
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The co-evolution of philosophical and legal pragmatism, perhaps 
interestingly, tells us something about the influence of legal thinking on 
philosophical pragmatism. Historians of pragmatism have noted that the 
informal club where philosophical pragmatism began, the “Metaphysical 
Club,” had more lawyers in its active membership, than it did scholars and 
thinkers from other fields.
214
 These “philosophical lawyers” didn‟t just view 
their task to be the application of philosophical pragmatism to the study and 
analysis of law.
215
 Instead, they used their unique world-view, which 
originated in their common understanding of the law as a dynamic body, 
“adaptable to changing social conditions,” and as embodying a “cumulative 
social product of practical decisions”, to influence the very development of 
philosophical pragmatism.
216
 In other words, these lawyers‟ unique 
approach to the questions of legal philosophy contributed to the very 
“genesis” of pragmatism as a philosophical movement. Foremost among 
these philosophically minded lawyers was Nicholas St. John Green, who 
influenced Peirce, Holmes and a host of others in the club through his 
unique way of thinking about questions in the area of legal philosophy.
217
 
Charles Sanders Peirce, considered to be the father of American 
pragmatism, himself described Green as the “grandfather of pragmatism”, 
and Green‟s thinking played a very important role in shaping Holmes‟s.
218
 
Indeed, the pervasiveness of this „lawyerly‟ influence on the movement 
(pragmatism) is borne out in the fact that John Dewey, the prominent 
pragmatist philosopher ventured into addressing questions about the 
appropriate approach to legal analysis,
219
 the normative vacuity of legal 
concepts,
220
 and the connection between legal analysis and other 
disciplines,
221
 for legal audiences.  
Even those committed to the freestanding nature of legal 
pragmatism such as Grey, readily concede the possibility that legal 
pragmatism—originating in the common law method of contextualized, 
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evolutionary rule development—may have played a role in the development 
of philosophical pragmatism.
222
 The principal idea behind the freestanding 
move then, appears to the recognition that the critique of philosophical 
formalism as a form of impractical “escapism” doesn‟t on its own extend to 
legal formalism, which despite all else, is deeply practical when understood 
as an approach to adjudication.
223
 The freestanding point is thus largely 
irrelevant for our purposes, for it merely seeks to eliminate the idea that 
legal pragmatism is an off-shoot of philosophical pragmatism, but remains 
open (and perhaps endorses?) the idea that legal pragmatism influenced its 
philosophical counterpart. 
Much like general pragmatism, legal pragmatism emphasizes a 
focus on the practical consequences of a rule or concept over its immanent 
structure.
224
 It is thus empiricist in outlook and orientation, except that the 
value of these consequences can be measured by a host of perspectives, 
which pragmatism can accommodate. It is in this sense “inclusive” as an 
approach, or anti-foundational in outlook.
225
 Understanding consequences 
also requires contextualization, and legal pragmatism thus also emphasizes 
the importance of thinking about legal concepts and ideas situationally, and 
never in the abstract.
226
 This doesn‟t eliminate the possibility of 
generalization, it just emphasizes the importance of not allowing 
generalized abstractions to assume a metaphysical (or immanent) 
significance of their own, that then becomes normatively salient. Anti-
foundationalism (or ethical pluralism), contextualization, and 
instrumentalism (in the consequence-focused sense) are thus today seen as 
the “essential” elements of legal pragmatism.
227
 
Gandhi‟s dealings with copyright law once again bear strong 
similarities to the pragmatic method. Yet here, it transcends pragmatism as 
a mere philosophical approach and exhibits a stark similarity to legal 
pragmatism. Gandhi certainly began with an attempt to disengage with 
copyright as a modern institution. All the same, the normative basis of the 
early disengagement wasn‟t modernity as such. It was instead on deeper 
examination, the effect that his assertion of copyright might have had on the 
sales of newspapers that he operated. The “artificial” scarcity that would 
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have been copyright‟s most immediate consequence would have led people 
to buy Navjivan and Young India (newspapers that Gandhi ran) solely to 
read his articles, rather than because of the intrinsic worth of the 
newspapers‟ overall message and content, which Gandhi had hoped to 
spread. The consequence would have thus been an obscuring of readers‟ 
motives, which Gandhi sought to avoid. We may of course debate the 
desirability of this consequence from a host of perspectives, but the fact of 
the matter remains that Gandhi‟s target was the consequence. We see this 
consequence-sensitivity more starkly in his worry that maintaining the 
translation rights to his autobiography as an “exclusive” right would impede 
the development of independent translations, each with its own value. 
With its focus on copyright‟s consequences, Gandhi‟s approach thus 
by necessity had to be contextual. In situations where the consequences he 
sought to avoid were unlikely to transpire, or were indeed capable of being 
allayed, his basic opposition to the institution too declined. This perhaps 
explains his reluctant acceptance of copyright in his autobiography (in 
relation to Macmillan), recognizing that it wouldn‟t produce the artificial 
scarcity that he worried about in India, but instead only in the West, where 
it would perhaps have been less problematic. Contextualization in legal 
pragmatism is thought to necessitate incremental modifications and changes 
in a rule/position, obviously as the context changes.
228
 Once again, 
Gandhi‟s nuanced separation of the right of first translation from any rights 
in the translation itself, and his willingness to undertake these first 
translations himself contemporaneously with his original writing, reflect 
both a situation-sensitivity and an incremental modification in position, 
both characteristic of pragmatic legal analysis. 
Yet the question of course remains: to what extent was Gandhi‟s 
approach to copyright truly pluralistic, or anti-foundational in outlook? 
Even hardened utilitarians who accept the normative tenets of legal 
pragmatism, such as Richard Posner, are forced to concede that they have to 
abandon their single-minded devotion to wealth-maximization as the sole 
normative goals of legal analysis.
229
 Gandhi‟s basic rejection seems to have 
strong overtones of an anti-utilitarian world-view. Over time however, what 
his engagement with copyright certainly reveals is that while a rejection of 
core utilitarian beliefs represented his default outlook, it didn‟t form a 
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foundational philosophical position that Gandhi was unwilling to 
compromise on. When injected with clear distributive elements, Gandhi saw 
the downsides of utilitarianism being outweighed by their situational 
upside, as long as he remained conscious of (and maintained) the balance.  
The commitment to anti-foundationalism certainly doesn‟t mean that 
legal pragmatists cannot stand for something. Indeed the famous 
observation that “if you don‟t stand for something, you‟ll fall for anything” 
is a concern that legal pragmatism takes seriously in avoiding the accusation 
that it promotes purely ad hoc decision-making.
230
 All the same, standing 
for something doesn‟t also mean an unreflective stubborn unwillingness to 
compromise. Truth, to Gandhi wasn‟t static, it was instead situational and in 
some sense represented “man‟s fallible groping for order,” which was to the 
early pragmatists, the very idea of justice, requiring an “intelligent 
compromise” all along.
231
 Gandhi‟s anti-utilitarian baseline was thus hardly 
a foundational idea, but a default. Indeed, given his willingness to treat truth 
as an anti-foundational idea—despite equating it to God—it would have 
been surprising if he had adhered to the baseline dogmatically. Situational, 
intelligent compromise was to him the essence of all decision-making, 
which in some sense is at the very heart of anti-foundationalism. 
 
*  *  * 
 
If Gandhi‟s practical idealism was thus a form of philosophical 
pragmatism, and his engagement with copyright law in essence a form of 
legal pragmatism—the question remains, of where these parallels came 
from. As noted earlier, some historical evidence suggests that American 
pragmatism as a philosophical movement, post-dated pragmatic legal 
analysis in the common law, and was likely influenced to some measure (if 
not significantly) by it. Even those committed to a freestanding version of 
legal pragmatism seem willing to accept this idea. In a similar vein, others 
note that the ideal of practical wisdom was one that the legal professionals 
historically aspired towards, since all legal reasoning is in essence practical 
reasoning, and wisdom in performing the latter thus correlates to heightened 
acumen in navigating the former.
232
 Where then did Gandhi‟s pragmatic 
leanings come from? One may tentatively speculate that it was in his 
training as a common lawyer. 
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What is often forgotten in almost all discussion of Gandhi‟s 
philosophical and political ideas is that he trained in England as a barrister, 
practiced law in South Africa where he developed his political strategies, 
before returning to India to join the freedom movement.
233
 While Gandhi 
later denounced the legal profession, he nonetheless acknowledged that his 
training in Roman law, and his reading of Justinian‟s Institutes helped him 
immensely in understanding South African law.
234
 He notes how he studied 
numerous basic common law subjects, the law of equity, and a variety of 
other areas for nearly a year before passing the examination and being 
called to the Bar in England.
235
 One may thus speculate that Gandhi‟s 
training as a common lawyer, and his acculturation in the common law 
method of case law study, influenced his practical idealism to a good 
degree, especially since his political advocacy in South Africa often 
intertwined with complex legal questions.
236
 Indeed, one noted historian 
even observes that Gandhi‟s legal activism in South Africa employed a 
form of “cautious incrementalism.
237
” The common law has for long been 
thought to embody an approach to practical reasoning that is acutely 
pragmatic and incremental, ideas that we see in his engagement with 
copyright law.
238
 Perhaps it was his training as a lawyer then, which 
influenced this core dimension of his philosophy of action. 
This answer must of course remain tentative, given that Gandhi in 
his later life routinely denounced the legal profession, its moral and political 
corruption, and indeed at one point even sought to have lawyers removed 
from leadership positions in the freedom movement.
239
 Yet, his concern in 
this critique was more with the legal profession and its willing acceptance 
of the ethical values and norms as dictated by the colonial government. In 
thus concluding that Gandhi‟s training as a common lawyer must have had 
some, non-negligible influence in the development of his pragmatic 
philosophy and more specifically, in the development of his pragmatic 
approach to copyright law, I nonetheless leave for future work, a fuller 
exploration of Gandhi‟s vision for the legal profession and the normativity 
of the law that it embodies. 
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B. Unpacking Copyright Pragmatism 
 
Gandhi‟s views on copyright law and his engagement with the 
institution over the course of his life were thus informed in large part by his 
pragmatic philosophy of action. Not only were they reasoned positions, but 
Gandhi was also able and willing to adapt them to changing circumstances 
contextually as and when needed, in truly incremental fashion. What is 
crucial to appreciate though is that in this pragmatic approach, Gandhi‟s 
position never degenerated into one of overt consequentialism, despite his 
deep sensitivity to the consequences of his every action. Additionally, 
Gandhi‟s views on copyright—and their transformation over time—
evidence an acute early awareness of some of the most important structural, 
substantive and normative issues that have since come to be recognized as 
central to debates and discussions about copyright law.  
Foremost among these is the idea that copyright, when deployed 
under certain circumstances, can indeed become a freedom-impeding 
mechanism. By constraining the expressive and communicative activities of 
others under the rubric of exclusivity, it runs the risk of producing large, 
immeasurable, medium and long-term harm, which Gandhi sought to 
anticipate and alleviate as best as he could. Scholars today recognize that 
copyright law is a centerpiece of the second “enclosure movement,” 
imposing undue burdens on speech, access, and creativity, all of which was 
central to Gandhi‟s skepticism.
240
 Second, Gandhi recognized that 
copyright‟s primary justification—of inducing creativity through rational 
self-interested behavior—may not hold true in numerous situations. To 
Gandhi, as a personal matter, this fundamental premise of the entire 
copyright system rang false, which produced his default baseline, 
previously discussed. Yet, Gandhi was astute enough to recognize that his 
position wasn‟t the only one tenable in society, which explains his masterful 
recognition of copyright‟s limited desirability in pockets. Over the last 
decade or so, copyright‟s core incentive rationale has in a similar vein been 
called into question and by most accounts shown to be less than universally 
true in both theory and practice.
241
 Third, Gandhi over time seems to have 
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believed that he could infuse copyright law with normative ideals that may 
not be fundamental to the institution as originally conceived—such as 
distributive justice, and the prevention of commercial exploitation of a work 
when undesirable. In so doing, Gandhi came to treat the formal structure of 
copyright law as a means of solving the problem of incommensurability in a 
contextual manner, and effectively subverted its core utilitarian structure 
towards distinctively non-utilitarian goals.
242
 Again, copyright scholars 
have begun suggesting this idea in the last decade or so. Lastly, Gandhi‟s 
engagement with copyright and his identification of its potential strengths 
and weaknesses seem to have taught him to approach the institution in a 
non-dogmatic manner, allowing him to modify and rationalize his position 
over time, as circumstances changed. 
Gandhi‟s interactions with copyright law thus together represent a 
unique approach to thinking about the institution—best described as 
copyright pragmatism. Neither minimalist nor expansionist in outlook, 
copyright pragmatism represents a meaningful mechanism of engaging with 
the institution of copyright, by recognizing it for what it is and how it 
works, and acknowledging its clear desirability in certain situations. At the 
same time, drawing on pragmatism‟s unwillingness to accept objective 
abstractions as truth, it maintains a constant state of alertness about the 
perils and costs of the institution, and looks for reasoned compromises that 
can be sustained over time. It thus entails four inter-related features: (i) a 
fundamentally critical attitude towards copyright, (ii) an outcome-sensitive 
assessment of, and engagement, with the institution, (iii) an attempt to see 
the institution as capable of affirming plural normative ideals contextually 
during such engagement, and (iv) an allowance for a gradual modification 
of position over time and context, with experience. Each of these ideas is 
worth elaborating on. 
 
1. Critical Orientation 
 
Copyright pragmatism begins with a basically critical approach 
towards the institution of copyright. All the same, this critical orientation 
doesn‟t of necessity translate into forms of copyright skepticism, 
minimalism, or indeed nihilism. It originates instead in the recognition that 
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as a creation of the law,
243
 copyright remains an artificial institution in the 
sense that its functioning is premised on certain assumptions about human 
behavior, creativity, and social welfare, not all of which need hold true 
under all circumstances. This critical orientation also takes as a core 
attribute of the copyright system, the reality that its very existence and 
functioning produce various kinds of social costs or restrictions on freedom. 
While accepting these realities as a given, copyright pragmatism 
nonetheless recognizes there to be a limited, yet important role for the 
institution, in the domains where its core assumptions do indeed hold true 
and where the system‟s benefits outweigh its costs. This recognition in turn 
produces a form of compromise that allows the copyright pragmatist to 
accept the legitimacy of copyright as an institution, but with due caution. 
The compromise thus results in an outlook that is best characterized as 
“doubting” or dubitante, a term used where the actor is critical of a position 
but nonetheless willing to go along out of a sense of compromise.
244
 
Copyright pragmatism‟s critical orientation towards copyright bears 
the imprint of a core element of pragmatist thinking known as 
“fallibilism
245
,” the philosophical idea that “there is no conclusive 
justification and no rational certainty for any of our beliefs or theses.
246
” 
Translated to the copyright context, fallibilism produces the recognition that 
the institution of copyright is a circumstantial necessity, but that its core 
assumptions are capable of being proven false with due empirical evidence 
in individual circumstances. Copyright‟s institutional structure is thus 
accepted, but treated as fundamentally defeasible. Indeed, it is copyright 
pragmatism‟s use of fallibilism that prevents it from collapsing into a form 
of skepticism that is characteristic of copyright minimalism (and copyright 
nihilism). 
Whereas fallibilism begins with the idea that truths and beliefs are 
contextually falsifiable with evidence, it is routinely distinguished from 
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skepticism (as a philosophical approach), which takes the extreme position 
of denying the very possibility of truth, knowledge, and belief.
247
 A 
skeptical outlook towards copyright would thus translate into a denial of the 
very possibility that any of its core assumptions (which it of course treats as 
truths) is knowable, which ought to translate into a rejection of its basic 
apparatus. Fallibilism goes nowhere near as far as this. It expresses doubt 
about the universality of copyright‟s core assumptions, but doesn‟t deny the 
possibility that they could indeed remain true in situations.
248
 It asks instead 
that the truth in these assumptions not be taken as a given, but instead be 
shown empirically.  
 
2. Consequence-sensitivity 
 
As a form of pragmatism, copyright pragmatism insists that the basis 
of one‟s engagement with the institution be measured entirely by the 
practical consequences that such engagement is likely to produce, and 
concomitantly, the possibility of minimizing their deleterious effects. 
Consequence-sensitivity remains different from consequentialism.
249
 
Whereas in the latter, consequences motivate and dictate the very choice of 
means, in the former, practical consequences—as an experiential 
category—form a benchmark against which to assess one‟s actions and 
beliefs rather than motivating any a priori choice among them. Thus for 
instance, utilitarianism—the best-known form of consequentialism—insists 
that one‟s actions remain directed towards a particular end, namely 
maximizing overall utility.
250
 Given this end, it thus motivates actors to 
choose certain means to comport with the objective. Consequence-
sensitivity on the other hand gives actors broad discretion in their choice of 
means, which it recognizes could be motivated by a variety of 
considerations, but nonetheless insists that in refining, validating, and 
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understanding these means, the actor pay due regard to the effects that they 
are likely to produce when put into action. It thus emphasizes a form of 
reflexive interaction between the means and ends of any engagement. 
This heightened consequence-sensitivity no doubt makes copyright 
pragmatism instrumental in orientation and outlook. Yet, the 
instrumentalism it produces is more complex and nuanced than what the 
banal understanding of the term ordinarily presupposes. For one, the nature 
of the consequences that the actor is to be sensitive to is in many ways left 
entirely up to the actor to determine (unlike other forms of 
consequentialism). Thus, the actor may choose to look to short-, medium-, 
or long-term consequences during the refinement of his or her means, and it 
says nothing of which of these is to be preferred or prioritized. 
To the copyright pragmatist, consequence-sensitivity drives the 
precise nature and form of any engagement with copyright law. It thus 
emphasizes a constant alertness to the effects of one‟s actions, a position 
that flows automatically from the critical default that the actor begins from. 
The reflexivity of act and consequence in this understanding also forces the 
actor to change the nature of the engagement with copyright, or to 
supplement it with additional safeguards, when the consequences—likely or 
actual—are seen to be antagonistic to the ideals and values of the actor. A 
formulaic, mechanistic (or formal) acceptance of the institution is thus 
anathema to copyright pragmatism. 
 
3. Normative Pluralism 
 
As an approach that avoids dictating which consequences matter 
more, or indeed how those consequences are to be addressed, copyright 
pragmatism of necessity allows for multiple, seemingly incommensurable, 
values to be realized in the functioning of the copyright system.
251
 All the 
same, this doesn‟t mean that it allows the actor to engage with copyright in 
a purely ad hoc fashion. Copyright pragmatism takes seriously the idea that 
the institution‟s very existence and structural apparatus reflect a basic 
compromise solution to a multiplicity of social values—utilitarian, 
distributive, deontic, and political—and that copyright is capable of 
affirming and instantiating these various ideas when needed. It does so 
contextually, through a form of practical reasoning that is embedded within 
the very architecture of the institution. 
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Indeed, it is this normative pluralism that allowed Gandhi to 
reluctantly accept copyright to affirm its utilitarian (i.e., market-oriented) 
goals during the negotiations with MacMillan, and later on use copyright to 
selectively undermine those very same utilitarian goals. What is critical in 
this affirmation though is that the institution of copyright come to be seen as 
distinctively legal in origin and structure, and therefore susceptible to forms 
of legal reasoning that in turn embody the virtues of practical reasoning, 
long known to be a mechanism of solving the problem of 
incommensurability between conflicting normative ideals.
252
 Copyright 
pragmatism‟s normative pluralism thus entails a fundamental acceptance of 
the institution‟s legal origins, which makes the recourse to practical 
reasoning both possible and meaningful. 
None of this of course means that a copyright pragmatist necessarily 
needs to be a legal positivist. The copyright pragmatist readily recognizes 
that copyright law originates in both source-based and content-based 
considerations, whereas positivism consciously excludes the latter.
253
 The 
additional move that the pragmatist makes then is to merely acknowledge 
the plurality of content-based considerations that motivate the institution‟s 
different moving parts. This certainly necessitates a basic familiarity with 
copyright‟s legal structure and its reliance basic legal concepts and 
principles, which in turn implies that copyright pragmatism is at base a 
theory that has it most appeal to those trained in the working of legal 
reasoning, i.e., lawyers. This isn‟t to suggest that non-lawyers can never be 
copyright pragmatists; just that the strengths of copyright pragmatism are 
best realized when deployed by those conversant with the ways and 
methods of legal argumentation as a form of practical reasoning. 
 
4. Contextual modification 
 
A commitment to value pluralism also implies a willingness to 
modify and adapt one‟s position on an issue circumstantially, as additional 
information (specific to the issue) becomes available. Indeed, this 
circumstantial updating and modification has remained a hallmark of the 
“common law method” of rule development, long known to be pragmatic in 
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orientation.
254
 In a similar vein, copyright pragmatism requires actors to 
approach their engagement with copyright in a palpably non-dogmatic 
manner. This implies that in specific situations, when circumstances so 
necessitate, it might indeed require them to alter their beliefs about the 
institution. The compromise is however always a reasoned one—an 
attribute that is crucial to appreciate. Rather than simply allowing for the 
reversal of one‟s position on an issue relating to copyright and 
characterizing it as a compromise, copyright pragmatism requires that an 
actor reason his or her way through the decision, and provide a rational 
account for how and why the additional contextual information that is now 
available necessitates a modification in position. The compromise is thus 
meant to be fundamentally “deliberative.” 
In this latter sense then, copyright pragmatism requires that a 
contextual modification of one‟s position on a copyright issue involve a 
reconciliatory engagement with the basis for one‟s prior positions. It entails 
what Kronman describes as the twin attributes of “sympathy” and 
“detachment,” wherein the actor is able to synthesize his or her former and 
present positions by recognizing them to be the result of constrained 
circumstances.
255
 It is precisely through this synthesis that the 
incommensurability of copyright‟s conflicting normative values can be 
addressed situationally. The copyright pragmatist might thus favor 
copyright‟s fundamental utilitarian idea in certain contexts, for example 
when it may be deployed towards palpable distributive goals, and might 
later choose to reject the utilitarian idea when the distributive concerns are 
overwhelming and at the same time incapable of being accommodated 
within their utilitarian counterparts. Each position comes to be seen as 
motivated by the peculiarities of the context rather than as an abstract 
commitment to one value (i.e., utilitarianism or distributive justice) over the 
other, where it might be seen as an inconsistency. The context of the choice, 
and the consequences each choice will likely produce, together dictate the 
position of the copyright pragmatist. When these twin variables change, so 
too does the copyright pragmatist‟s position. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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 Across the world, Gandhi is recognized in the public mind as a 
political visionary, principally for his views on non-violence and freedom. 
In this Essay, I have attempted to show that his status as a visionary thinker 
deserves extension well beyond the political domain, to a distinctively legal 
issue: copyright law. 
 Instead of adopting a position on the usefulness of copyright along 
the lines suggested by his abstract economic ideas, Gandhi‟s views on 
copyright were informed almost entirely by his unique philosophy of 
action—which he termed “practical idealism”. Distinctively pragmatic in 
orientation, and focused as it was on the context and consequences of his 
engagement with an institution, Gandhi‟s approach to copyright exhibits a 
nuance, practical wisdom, and masterful deployment of the institution on a 
reasoned basis. In interacting with the institution and working through its 
various moving parts, we see Gandhi intertwining his views on freedom, 
access to knowledge, censorship, and creative self-expression with his 
training as lawyer in the U.K., and his experience as a lawyer-activist in 
South Africa. Gandhi‟s attempt to achieve a measure of coherence (in 
approach) during these interactions remains a powerful example of the 
virtues inherent in practical reasoning as a mechanism of balancing 
incommensurable normative values situationally. 
 Gandhi‟s engagement with copyright law bears the indelible imprint 
of his training as a lawyer. Gandhi himself of course never once 
acknowledged the role his training and work as a lawyer played in 
developing his philosophy of action. Nonetheless, the undeniable link 
between philosophical and legal pragmatism as ways of thinking, together 
with the uncanny resemblance that Gandhi‟s own version of pragmatism 
bears to its American counterpart, suggests that it likely played an 
important, even if only subconscious role in the evolution of his philosophy 
of action.  
 In adopting a pragmatic approach to copyright law, and engaging 
with the institution in a situation-sensitive, analytical manner, Gandhi 
foreshadowed a unique approach to copyright law that I have described in 
this Essay as “copyright pragmatism.” Copyright pragmatism is today 
hardly unique or indeed rare, and is indeed an approach adopted by a large 
number of modern copyright scholars, lawyers, and activists. It is perhaps, 
as William James, said of pragmatism more generally, “a new term for 
some [established] ways of thinking
256
”. Yet, what makes Gandhi‟s 
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identification and development of the approach on his own unique and 
noteworthy is that he did it in an era, and under conditions, where the costs 
and harms of an over-expansive copyright regime were neither obvious nor 
salient in the public mind. Indeed, it wasn‟t until the year 1996 that scholars 
came to see copyright law as fraught with problems for access, free speech, 
and creative freedom, spawning the movement that is today known as 
“cultural environmentalism.
257
” Gandhi‟s recognition of the problem nearly 
eight decades before the movement is ample testament to his wisdom and 
foresight.  
 In addition, in his commitment to action rather than abstraction, 
Gandhi didn‟t just stop at identifying the problem. He produced remedies 
and solutions, which while personal to him, nonetheless sought to minimize 
the systemic harms and costs of the copyright system when he interacted 
with it. As his interactions with copyright became more frequent, he 
eventually developed approaches that were openly subversive, and engaged 
the system primarily to undermine its core goals and assumptions, while 
infusing it with others that were of direct relevance to him. The closest 
analogues one finds in modern copyright discourse to Gandhi‟s copyright 
pragmatism are the Open Source and Creative Commons licensing 
movements, both of which seek to unbundle copyright‟s bundle of rights, 
and use them strategically rather than under a one-size-fits-all rubric.  
Open source licensing involves the assertion of copyright by a 
creator who then allows it to be used or copied under a mass market license 
that emphasizes among other things, the ideals of “unencumbered 
redistribution,” the creator‟s right to be attributed, and the maintenance of 
the integrity of the work.
258
 Even though it views copyright as 
fundamentally freedom-impeding, the open source movement chooses to 
neutralize copyright‟s harms by asserting copyright in a work and then 
licensing it away under freedom-promoting conditions.
259
 It is perhaps no 
coincidence that founder of the open source movement characterized it as a 
form of “pragmatic idealism.
260
” In a largely similar vein, Creative 
Commons, which similarly employs creative licensing techniques to 
unbundle copyright‟s various entitlements, has been characterized by 
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scholars as subversive, minimalist, and as embracing a wide-range of 
normative ideologies;
261
 indeed, ideas that one might perfectly associate 
with Gandhi‟s copyright pragmatism. Creative Commons emerged in 2001 
as a response to the fragmented nature of the copyright debate that had been 
initiated a few years earlier.
262
  
That Gandhi did in his interactions with copyright, what the 
“copyleft” and Creative Commons initiatives would do decades later, 
certainly doesn‟t diminish the novelty and importance of these later 
movements. It instead highlights the feasibility of copyright pragmatism 
emerging as a viable alternative to both copyright minimalism and 
fundamentalism, through similar incremental legal techniques that actively 
engage the copyright system, but seek to creatively infuse it with ideas, 
values, and ends otherwise alien to copyright‟s core apparatus. Discussions 
of copyright somewhat routinely ignore the legal origins of the institution, 
and the role it might play in alleviating many of copyright‟s basic problems 
by enabling actors to engage in a process of practical reasoning long. 
Gandhi‟s adventures with copyright law provide us with an inspiring 
example of how this might be fruitfully achieved. 
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